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NOISE REDUCTION: THE SCREENING VALUE
OF QUI TAM
ANTHONY J. CASEY
ANTHONY NIBLETT*
ABSTRACT

Whistle-blowing mechanisms have long been recognized and used as
tools to encourage the revelation of hidden information. The information
sought is often evidence of otherwise undetectable fraud. An effective
mechanism will be one that best deters such fraud. To do this, the
mechanism needs to produce high-quality information that is not
otherwise lost in the noise of low-quality information. In this paper, we
present a model to explore how the use of a court-centric qui tam
mechanism as opposed to an agency-driven mechanism can improve
whistle-blowing along these dimensions.
We compare two leading mechanisms that have been implemented in
high-profile federal statutes. The first is the court-centric qui tam
mechanism embodied in the False Claims Act. The second is the agencycentric system enacted as part of the Dodd FrankAct.
The model demonstrates that the qui tam mechanism which allows
whistleblowers to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the government produces
a separating equilibrium by imposing a private, loss contingent cost
commitment on whistleblowers. When whistleblowers possess private
information, the cost commitment screens out low-quality information
while maintainingthe incentives for high-quality information and lawsuits.
In turn, enforcement and deterrence are improved. Counterintuitively,
then, increasingcosts and lowering rewardsfor whistleblowers can often
lead to better enforcement and less fraud.

* Anthony Casey is an Assistant Professor at The University of Chicago Law School (email:
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Urska Velikonja, participants at the faculty workshop at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, the
University of Chicago Law School Works-in-Progress Workshop, the annual meeting of the European
Association of Law and Economics, the Chicago Junior Faculty Workshop, the Corporate and
Securities Litigation Workshop, and the Junior Business Law Conference, for helpful comments and
discussions, and thank Matthew Olson and Kaitlinn Sliter for research assistance. All errors are the
responsibility of the authors.

1169

1170

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:1169

We conclude by exploring applications of this model and the resulting
insightsforother areas of private information and third-party enforcement
mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION

On February 22, 2013, the Department of Justice joined a False Claims
Act lawsuit against Lance Armstrong and his associates.1 The case had

1. See United States' Notice of Election to Intervcene in Part, United States ex rel. Floyd Landis
v. Tailwind Sports Corp., No. 10-CV-00976, 2013 WL 769485 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2013); Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Joins Lawsuit Alleging Lance Armstrong and Others Caused the
Submission of False Claims to the U.S. Postal Service (Feb. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13 -civ-224.html.
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originally been filed by Floyd Landis years earlier.2 The substantive
allegations are straightforward. Armstrong and the other defendants had
taken sponsorship money from the United States Postal Service ("USPS")
while falsely representing that they were not using performance enhancing
drugs or other doping techniques.3 The facts are equally straightforward.
Armstrong famously confessed his sins of doping to Oprah.4 The contracts
between the defendants and the USPS contain representations that no
doping was occurring.5 All that remains is to determine whether that
constitutes a false claim and whether and to what extent the USPS was
damaged.
Procedurally, matters are not so straightforward. Landis, who has no
individual claims in this particular lawsuit, filed the suit as a qui tam
action on behalf of the United States. Under the False Claims Act

("FCA"), a qui tam action allows individuals (known as "relators") to file
and pursue suits for wrongs committed against the government. 6 Prior to
February 22, it was Landis and his lawyers expending the resources and
making the decisions in running the case. Pursuant to the statute, and the
extensions granted by the judge, the suit remained sealed until the
Department of Justice had completed its investigation and made a
determination to join the suit. Now the Department of Justice is at the
helm.8 But Landis still stands to receive a substantial percentage of any

2. Complaint for Violations of the Federal False Claims Act, United States ex rel. Floyd Landis
v. Tailwind Sports Corp., No. 10-CV-00976 (D.D.C. June 10, 2010).
3. Second Amended Complaint for Violations of the Federal Claims Act, at 11-16,
36-43,
United States ex rel. Floyd Landis v. Tailwind Sports Corp., No. 10-CV-00976, 2013 WL 647311
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2013).
4. Oprah and Lance Armstrong: The Worldwide Exclusive, (OWN television broadcast Jan. 17
& 18, 2013), available at http://www.oprah.com/own/Lance-Armstrong-Confesses-to-Oprah-Video
(video clip of part of broadcast) (last visited May 30, 2014). Prior to the Oprah Winfrey interview,
Armstrong had persistently and vehemently denied all allegations of doping. His admission resolves
some (though not all) of the foundational factual questions of the lawsuit.
5. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3.
6. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006) [hereinafter "FCA"]. The substance of the claim here is
somewhat uncommon for an FCA case. Most claims deal with recipients of government goods or more
traditional government contractors. Here the USPS was acting like a private sponsor. Nonetheless, its
location in the Federal government makes the FCA applicable. Other private sponsors are not covered.
7. Id.
8. Landis still retains some limited input in prosecuting cases. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (providing
that a relator remains a party but setting out limitations on their participation). Complicated questions
about jurisdiction, Landis's qualifications as an original source relator, and other procedural hurdles
imposed by the statute may remain. For example, Landis may not be able to recover anything if the
information contained in his suit was already public and he was not the "original source" of the
information. See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007). The defendants filed
motions to dismiss in July 2013. The motions have yet to be decided and turn largely on statute of
limitations grounds and the interplay between the FCA and the Wartime Suspension of Limitations
Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2012).
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USPS recovery. 9 And if history is any indicator, recovery is quite likely
now that the Department of Justice has taken over.10
Meanwhile, in the same district court, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has obtained an agreement from JPMorgan Chase to pay over
$296 million in fines for misleading investors about the quality of
mortgage-backed securities just before the 2008 financial crisis.1 1 How are
these cases connected? Whistleblowers. The lawsuit leading to the
JPMorgan settlement was brought by the SEC. But its allegations may
have been derived from information provided to it by one or more
unnamed whistleblowers 1 2 On February 8, 2013, the SEC invited any
individuals claiming to have provided information that led to the
settlement to make a claim for their whistleblower reward under the new
whistleblower provision in the Dodd-Frank Act ("DFA").13
The financial rewards for whistleblowers under the FCA and the DFA
are similar. 14 The procedural mechanisms for the JPMorgan
whistleblowers to report and recover under the DFA, however, are
different along many important dimensions from those for FCA claimants
like Floyd Landis. The FCA whistleblower brings the case directly to the
court on behalf of the government and must convince a judge that he has
cleared a number of statutory hurdles. DFA whistleblowers, on the other
hand, inform directly to the SEC. The procedure is more streamlined but
prosecution and recovery is at the discretion of the SEC. 15 At least in the

9.

See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (providing an award for relators ranging from ten and thirty percent

of the overall recovery).
10. There is a dramatic difference in overall success rate between those cases where the
government does and does not intervene. See David Kwok, Does Private Enforcement Attract
Excessive Litigation? Evidence from the False Claims Act, PUB. CONT. L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 10), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1832934 ("as of September 20,
2009, only 239 of 3,920 non-intervened cases resulted in a settlement or judgment in favor of the
United States, a 6% success rate. In comparison, of the 1,134 cases in which the DOJ intervened, 1,076

resulted in a settlement or judgment in favor of the United States, a 95% success rate."). See also
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 51 (2002) (finding a stark difference in

dismissal rates).
11. Litigation Release No. 22533, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges J.P. Morgan
Securities, LLC With Misleading Investors in RMBS Offerings (Nov. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22533.htm.
12. See Notices of Covered Actions: 2013 Archive, U.S. SEC.& EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.
gov/aboutoffices/owb/owb-awards/2013-nocas.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
13. Id.
14. The DFA ranges from ten to thirty percent and the FCA ranges from fifteen to thirty percent.
Compare Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1844 (2010) with 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(d).
15. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1844 ("Any determination
made under this section, including whether, to whom, or in what amount to make awards, shall be in

the discretion of the Commission"). The determination of the amount of the reward within the
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initial inquiry, the court has
no say in the DFA award, 16 and the DOJ has
1
7
award.
FCA
the
in
no say
Why the difference? And which is better? We explore those questions
in this Article. We present a model demonstrating the value of the FCA
qui tam mechanism in situations where it is difficult to verify the merits of
the whistleblower's claim. The qui tam process screens information and in
turn improves enforcement and deterrence. Screening models are, of
course, broadly relevant and well developed elsewhere. But the concept
has not been addressed in the FCA or the DFA whistleblower context. We
suggest that this neglected feature of the qui tam mechanism is perhaps its
defining and most valuable characteristic.
The existing literature on whistle-blowing has focused primarily on
(1) the incentive effects of whistleblower rewards and protection, 8 and
(2) the regulatory capture that may necessitate empowering individuals to
bring qui tam cases on behalf of the government.1 9 The first strand has

been well explored theoretically and a new empirical literature is emerging
to test those theories. 20 But these tell us little about the comparative

advantage of an FCA court-centric private-plaintiff mechanism and a DFA
agency-centric mechanism. 21

statutory bounds of ten and thirty percent is unreviewable and other determinations are reviewed by
the courts of appeals under the deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp.
IV 1965-69).
16. Id.
17. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (providing rules for awards in FCA cases).
18. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 Tx.L. REV.
1151 (2010); Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213
(2010).
19. See, e.g., Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall
Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 135; J.
Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradicationof Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 539 (2000); Bucy, supra note 10, at 51. A third strand might be identified in the work, theoretical
and empirical, on the proper design within one or the other mechanism. For example, David Freeman
Engstrom tests the effectiveness of professional relators and a "qui tam bar" within the FCA
mechanism. David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the PrivateAttorney General: Evidence from Qui
Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244 (2012). We do not here explore every design question
within each system. Our inquiry is more foundational in comparing an FCA-like mechanism to a DFAlike mechanism.
20. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 18. For a collection of empirical work, see Engstrom, supra
note 19, at 1269 n.83.
21. Ferziger and Currell compared the FCA to other bounty systems in place in 1999. Their
analysis long predates the DFA and the recent amendments to the FCA. They focused primarily on the
FCA's advantage in committing the government to a reward. That is not true of the agency
whistleblower schemes they examined. They also explore the optimal level of reward. Marsha J.
Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal
Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141.
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The second strand provides a regulatory-capture and agency-incentive
justification for preferring the court-centric private-plaintiff mechanism. 22
This suggests that executive agencies cannot be trusted, because of capture
or resource constraints. This reasoning is flawed and under theorized. It is
difficult to reconcile with any general theory of agency power. It provides
no coherent explanation for why a court-centric private plaintiff
mechanism should be utilized in whistleblower cases and not other agency
investigations, prosecutions, and regulation. Rather it suggests an unusual
and idiosyncratic solution for general agency-incentive problems and
suggests no reason to think that a court-centric solution will be more
effective than the alternatives. 23

We suggest a different justification for the FCA mechanism based on
information screening. Starting with a rational actor model and assuming
risk neutrality, we compare the two mechanisms.24 We show that the
court-centric private-plaintiff mechanism 25 is superior to the agencycentric mechanism 26 when there is asymmetric information 22 because it
screens for the most accurate information from whistleblowers. This
private cost commitment is not required of the SEC whistleblower under
the DFA scheme.
Thus, the qui tam design should-all else being equal-create a
separating equilibrium that enhances the overall quality of information to
the enforcers and reduces the costs of effective enforcement. In turn, the
design will increase the deterrence effect of whistle-blowing. These
screening benefits are particularly important for a whistleblower scheme
(with its inherent information asymmetry) 28 and the outcome does not

22. See, e.g., Rapp, supra note 19, at 135.
23. Regulatory capture has been studied generally. This literature identifies the problem in
various contexts beyond whistle-blowing and explores various proposals for structural solutions. See
Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of
Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J. EcON. 1089 (1991); Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism:
Regulatory Capture and Empowerment, 16 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 435 (1991); Michael E. Levine &
Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a
Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & Org., Special Issue, Jan. 1990, at 167; Michael A. Livermore & Richard L.
Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013); see also
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW To LIMIT IT (Daniel
Carpenter & David A. Moss, Eds., 2013).
24. See infra notes 143-44 for a discussion of the impact of risk aversion, irrationality, and the
role of non-pecuniary benefits for whistleblowers.
25. We will generally refer to this as the qui tam mechanism or the FCA-like mechanism.
26. We will refer to this as the DFA-like mechanism.
27. See infra Part II.A on the causes and dynamics of asymmetric information.
28. Information asymmetry exists when one party has information that is not available to the
other. Whistleblower mechanisms by definition presuppose this state of affairs. If information were
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turn on the quality of the enforcing agency or the level of agency-incentive
problems. We do not, however, suggest that all else is equal or that the
FCA is perfectly designed. Our point is simply that its value in screening
information through cost imposition has been under appreciated. To the
extent other mechanisms can be modified to achieve this screening, they
may be preferable to the FCA design.
Indeed, this analysis provides new, prescriptive guidelines generally for
designing whistleblower systems that effectively deter fraud in various
contexts. 29 Our analysis suggests that the worries of agency capture and a
reduced quantity of information under the DFA are overemphasized. The
more vexing concern will be an over-provision of tips relative to a
mechanism that imposes some cost on the whistleblowers. This overprovision will swamp the reviewing agency with low-quality information.
If the agency is budget constrained and cannot easily distinguish lowquality tips from high-quality tips, this shifts resources toward less
effective investigation. Alternatively, it may shift enforcement to other
types of cases with less information asymmetry even if those cases are
otherwise less important.30 By reducing effective enforcement, this will in
turn result in less deterrence.
Even in the FCA model, an increase in the bounty payment can often
lead to under-deterrence. That is, as the reward to the FCA relator is
increased, the benefit of the screening of the qui tam mechanism dissipates
and the outcome converges with the inefficient DFA result.3 1 Indeed, the

available to the Government, the whistleblower would not be necessary. For more on asymmetric
information, see infra Part II.A.
29. This analysis of the deterrence effect has been somewhat neglected in the literature
evaluating the DFA and FCA whistleblower mechanisms. David Kwok looks at the different
deterrence effects of FCA litigation in prosecuting different types of cases. He does not, however,

address the deterrent effect of the qui tam mechanism compared to other mechanisms. Additionally, in
addressing the way to increase deterrence, he concludes that the government should increase the
bounty payments. See David Y. Kwok, The Price of PrivateEnforcement Under the False Claims Act

13, 30 (Working Paper, Aug. 2012), available at: http://works.bepress.com/david kwok/5. Heidi
Hansberry also suggests that increased reporting leads to increased enforcement and, therefore,
increased deterrence. See Heidi L. Hansberry, Comment, In Spite of Its Good Intentions, The DoddFrank Act Has Created an FCPA Monster, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195 (2012). We suggest

that this is the wrong approach.
30. This may explain the surge in SEC enforcement of options-backdating investigations
following the news reports demonstrating the prevalence of and statistical roadmap to identifying such
violations even where the magnitude may have been quite small. On the rate of options -backdating
cases, see Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard, & Anat Carmy Wiechman, Scandal Enforcement at the
SEC: The Arc of the Options Backdating Investigations (U. of Mich. Law & Econ, Empirical Legal
Studies Ctr. Paper No. 11 -009; N.Y.U. Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11 -20, Jan. 14, 2013),
availableat http://papers.ssrn .com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1876725.
31. This is in direct contrast to Kwok, supra note 29, at 13, 30.
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screening model shows that the precise relationship between the level of
compensation and the private costs that whistle-blowing imposes is more
important than previously recognized.3 2 Our analysis also provides insight
into the failure of private-plaintiff mechanisms in other environments
where whistleblowers are not involved.33
We proceed in three parts. In Part I, we explore the contrasts between
the FCA and the DFA (and other mechanisms similar to the DFA). In Part
II, we illustrate the information screening value of the qui tam mechanism,
setting out a model for eliciting private information in the enforcement
context. Part III explores larger implications and limitations of this model,
namely (1) the likelihood that whistleblowers may not be motivated by
financial rewards, but rather by morality or revenge; (2) the costs and
errors that may arise when such mechanisms have been employed where
information screening was not a central concern; and (3) other areas of law
where we may or may not think court-centric private-plaintiff mechanisms
can be valuably employed for information screening.
I.

JUSTFYING THE COMPETING MECHANISMS

A. The Different Mechanisms
The mechanisms in the FCA and DFA are just two of many such
mechanisms-statutory and judge made-that provide for private
enforcement of public regulation. But they are among the most important.
Together false claims and securities fraud litigation account for thousands
of cases that have led to billions of dollars in recovery for the federal
government. 4 The FCA has been called the "gold standard" of
whistleblower legislation and provides a powerful example of the qui tam

32. Ferziger's and Currell's 1999 article stands out as one of the rare pieces in the literature to
note that a higher reward can lead to noise and inefficient enforcement. Ferziger & Currell, supra note
21, at 1172. For the most part, Ferziger and Currell treat costs as given and focus on optimal rewards.
They advocate a very low bounty to account for this and provide a model for setting rewards. We take
their analysis further, exploring the effects on deterrence and delving deeper into the cost side of the
equation. In contrast to their conclusion, our model suggests that rewards could be set very high (and
often should be) if loss-contingent costs can be increased.
33. Attempts at private enforcement of public regulation have been well documented across
various areas from corporate governance and securities to intellectual property to employment and
environment law. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms
in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012). Many view the use of this mechanism in areas
of corporate governance as a major failure. We explore the implications of our model in these broader
contexts in Part Ill.
34. See Engstrom, supra note 19, at 1246 n.2 (collecting statistics).
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mechanism.3 5 Its history since enactment during the Civil War has been
well documented.16 It has been amended many times and contains many
complex and at times difficult to interpret procedural provisions.3 In
short, those provisions bar whistleblowers from bringing a false claims
suit based on public information unless the whistleblower is the original
source of that information.38
The whistleblower files its lawsuit under seal and must provide the
underlying information to the government.3 9 The government has sixty
days (although extensions are often requested and granted) to review the
allegations before it must decide whether to intervene and take over the
lawsuit. 40 If the government intervenes it takes over primary control of the
lawsuit. If the government decides not to intervene, the relator retains
control.4 1

If the lawsuit is successful, the wrongdoer pays up to treble damages
and penalties and the whistleblower receives a bounty under the statute. 42
This reward ranges from twenty-five to thirty percent of recovered
damages where the government does not intervene and fifteen to twentyfive percent of recovered damages where the government does intervene.4 3
The DFA's section 922 is the latest high-profile whistleblower
provision. Modeled largely after the IRS's whistleblower program, 44 it
provides a bounty to whistleblowers that bring information to the SEC if
that information leads to a monetary sanction in a judicial or
administrative action.45 The bounty is only available if the action "results

35. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 319, 376 (2005).

36. See Matthew S. Brockmeier, Pulling the Plug on Health Care Fraud: The False Claims Act
after Rockwell and Allison Engine, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 277, 281-85 (2009) (discussing

history of the FCA); Engstrom, supra note 19, at 1270 (summarizing history and collecting sources).
37. See Engstrom, supra note 19. Over the years, the statute has led to numerous circuit splits in
interpreting various phrases within it. See Brockmeier, supra note 36, at 288-89 (noting the volume of
circuit splits and documenting that "[c]ourts have been asked to interpret virtually every word of every
provision of the Act at some point").
38. "False claims" include false claims for money from the govermnent under a contract or some
other legal right as well as false statements of money owed to the government (reverse false claims).
39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006).
40. Id.
41.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).

42. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
43. Id.
44. See Rapp, supra note 19, at 132. Historically, the IRS had discretionary authority to pay
whistleblowers. In 2006, awards became mandatory for large cases. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 18,
at 1168.
45. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1844 (2010).
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in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.,,46 The bounty given is
bounded by statute to be between ten and thirty percent of the monetary
sanctions imposed; but the exact amount within those bounds is subject to
the discretion of the SEC .4 The initial mechanism for the reward does not
involve the courts. The determination to issue or not issue the award may
be appealed directly to the court of appeals. For those challenges, the SEC
is given a high level of deference under 5 U.S.C. § 706.48 The
determination of the amount of the award cannot be challenged in the
courts.4 9

B. Existing Justifications
We demonstrate below that a central value of a qui tam mechanism
over other forms of whistleblower procedures is the information-screening
mechanism. An upshot of this is that qui tam is a particularly important
mechanism where there is asymmetric information that is difficult to
verify. Of the various justifications and benefits of the qui tam system over
other mechanisms, the screening mechanism we model is the most
distinctive-and potentially most valuable-feature of the mechanism.
Indeed, most of the existing justifications in the whistleblower literature
fail to explain why a qui tam process provides a better mechanism or why
that mechanism is uniquely valuable in the whistleblower context. We
explore these limitations of the existing literature in this section.
The goals of a whistleblower mechanism are plain: we want to elicit
the most accurate information at the lowest cost in order to deter fraud.
The means are more complicated. The foundational inquiry, which has
been explored in great detail, is whether it makes sense to pay individuals
5
for information>.
The benefits of payment lie in the creation of pecuniary
incentives to nudge otherwise reluctant informants to reveal what they
know. The problems might include encouraging false information, and
crowding out information that would otherwise be provided for nonpecuniary reasons that include moral or ethical considerations.5 1

46. Id.
47.

Id.

48. Id.
49. Id. As of the end of the 2013 fiscal year, the SEC has made only six whistleblower awards as
the bulk of qualifying cases are still pending. Five of the awards were in the thousands of dollars. The
sixth was an award of $14 million. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 14-15, available at http://www.sec.gov/aboud/

offices/owb/annual-report-2013.pdf.
50. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 18; Rapp, supra note 19; Engstrom, supra note 19.
51. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 18 (on the interplay of moral and pecuniary incentives).
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Nonetheless, recent empirical work shows that monetary incentives for
fraud revelation do have a strong, positive effect on an employee's
decision to blow the whistle.5 2 This result holds irrespective of the severity
of the fraud. The level of false information has been harder to test. 4
A second question that arises is who should receive the information
from the whistleblower and what should be done with it. A fear of
regulatory capture and political influence has led many to believe that the
individuals within executive branch agencies and departments cannot be
trusted with acting on information that their long-time business partners
are defrauding the government. The regulatory-capture story is that the
industry has "captured" the agency and exercises influence on its
55
decisions. The political influence story is similar. The influence comes
from politically elected officials above the agency. In turn, those officials
may be captured by special-interest groups. The solutions to these
problems may be at odds with each other: political oversight might curb
regulatory capture at the agency level but increase potentially problematic
political influence. In that sense, the political oversight just moves the
capture problem up one step in the command chain.

The argument that providing financial rewards may crowd out better information comes from
behavioral psychology literature. We do not address this argument in detail. The idea is that providing
information is good when provided with altruistic motives. Increasing the rewards dilutes the quality
of the information because informers feel the monetary reward cheapens their role. See Diego G.
Pardow, What Should We Expect From the Dodd-Frank Bounty Program? (Working Paper, July 23,
2012), available at http://works.bepress.com/dpardow/l. This argument assumes that altruistic
ventures, such as donating blood, may lose their altruistic qualities once financial compensation is
given. This may lead to a "crowding out" of blood, especially high-quality blood. See RICHARD M.
TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971); Philippa
Howden-Chapman, John Carter, & Nicholas Woods, Blood Money: Blood Donors' Attitudes to
Changes in the New Zealand Blood Transfusion Service, 312 BRITISH MED. J. 1131 (1996). The
evidence for this idea, however, in the blood donation context is somewhat mixed. See, e.g., Carl
Mellstrm & Magnus Johannesson, Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?, 6 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS'N 845 (2008) (finding no crowding out effect in males, but a significant effect in females);
Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis, & Robert Slonim, Rewarding Altruism? A Natural Field Experiment
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17636, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w17636.
52. Dyck et al., supra note 18, at 2215. The authors find that this effect is particularly strong in
the healthcare industry. Engstrom suggests that Dyck et al.'s result may follow from the fact that
potential whistleblowers in the healthcare industry are better positioned to observe fraud because of
the industry's relatively flat organizational structure and the result tells us little about the degree of
crowding out compared to a world where bounties are not available to healthcare workers. David
Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge
of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2341808.
53. Dyck et al., supra note 18, at 2215.
54. There may also be concerns that rewards might lead potential whistleblowers to facilitate or
encourage fraud in hopes of reporting it later. There is no evidence that this is a significant problem.
55. See sources cited supra note 23.
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These fears have long been cited as a defense of the FCA's grant of
prosecutorial authority to individuals on behalf of the government. When
the executive branch fails to do so, the individual may pursue the case in
court subject to dismissal by the court.56 Similarly, regulatory capture has
been at the heart of critiques of alternative mechanisms like the DFA.
Because those mechanisms leave the discretion to the government agency,
it is argued, they lead to too few investigations and prosecutions.5
This argument places a great deal of faith in the judiciary as immune to
agency capture. The assumption is that the judiciary is not subject to
outside influence and enforcement constraints the way that agencies are.
While this may be correct, the conclusion requires more theoretical and
empirical grounding than has been provided.58 Of course, this faith (often
under-theorized) in courts as outside guardians of proper incentives is not
at all unique to this case. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have noted
that this problem-which they label the inside-outside problem-is an
incoherency that pervades much of legal scholarship. 59 As Posner and
Vermeule point out, it may very well be true that courts have more publicspirited and less selfish motives than other government actors, or that the
institutional structure constrains their self-driven motives more, but that
point should not be assumed without further foundational support.60
On the other side of the equation, the arguments in favor of a judicial
process assume that no executive agency can be designed to significantly
reduce regulatory capture. This assumption has stronger empirical and
theoretical support. While the SEC's organization as an independent
agency 61 may be viewed as an attempt to reduce political influence from
the executive, 62 many suspect there is a regulatory-capture problem that

56.
57.
58.
Working

The real shift might be not to the relators but to the courts that exercise ultimate authority.
Rapp, supra note 19.
Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System? (Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Paper No. 422, Mar. 2013), available at http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public law

and legal theory/395/.
59. Id. at 22, 37.

60. Id. at 7-8. It is also possible that if courts defer to government agencies, they could indirectly
be captured by the industry. Government agencies or departments are captured by the industry; the
court defers to the government; the court has thus been captured.
61. On independent agencies, see Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through InstitutionalDesign, 89 TX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (discussing the key features of independent
agencies); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013).
62. Some may argue that its independence exacerbates the regulatory capture problem, because
the executive has less direct control and the industry is especially influential. Of course, that might be
viewed as trading capture from one constituency for capture from another. Barkow, supra note 61, at

34-35 (summarizing various arguments).
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arises from the coziness that exists between the SEC and the finance
industry. But all of this begs the question of why we worry more or
differently about capture in whistleblower cases. Agencies routinely
investigate, enforce and regulate industries where the risk of capture is
high. Much ink has been spilled in suggesting mechanisms and structures
that employ internal and external checks on a given agent's bad incentives.
Dual agencies, independent monitors, court oversight, congressional
oversight, and overlapping state power are just a few of the proposed
solutions. 64 Even oversight by a central agency like DOJ or OIRA can be
seen as a potential curb to some of the agency-capture problems. 65 It is not
clear why the use of private plaintiffs and the shift of gatekeeping to the
courts are better than other solutions; or, if they are, why they should only
be utilized in the whistleblower cases.
Indeed, one might worry more about the non-whistleblower cases. The
SEC's capture by the industry should concern us with SEC criminal
enforcement, SEC rule setting, SEC trading review, and so on. The
assumption that we only worry about the capture when an outsider blows a
whistle on an offense unknown to the SEC has a weak logical foundation.
This point can be seen in other areas of regulation that intersect with
the FCA. For example, the Minerals Management Service (MMS)
(formerly an agency of the Department of the Interior) regulated federal
natural resources and collected royalties on oil and gas taken from Federal
lands. 66 The MMS was disgraced in 2008 when it came to light that its
employees received lavish gifts from industry representatives and had
"frequently consumed alcohol at industry functions, had used cocaine and

63. See Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop?, The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REv. 785, 785-86

(2009) ("The SEC has been the target of relentless criticism ...[including] assertions of delays and
blunders and possible industry capture .. ");
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory
Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1861 (1995).
64. See sources cited supra notes 19 & 20.
65. See, e.g., Christopher C. Demuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); John 0. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional
Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U.
CHm.L. REv. 407 (1990); but see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1308, 1312 (2006). The nuances of these arguments are
further discussed in Barkow, supra note 61; Ryan Bubb & Patrick Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and
Regulatory Review (N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-69; N.Y.U.
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-47, Jan. 15, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.conl
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2201042; and Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential
Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755 (2013).
66. The MMS no longer exists. It has been replaced by the Bureau of Ocean Energy

Management and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. See The Reorganization of
the Former MMS, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., http://www.boem.gov/About-BOEM/
Reorganization/Reorganization.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
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marijuana, and had sexual relationships with oil and natural gas company
representatives.
One might be relieved to know that when whistleblowers allege that
the MMS was duped out of royalties on federal oil or gas, the Department
of Justice cannot prevent the case from going forward. But it is not clear
why. The DOJ is not the captured agency in these cases. 68 A simpler
solution, if direct agency capture was the main problem, might have been
just to move the prosecution on tips up to the DOJ level without granting
qui tam protection. Some have even suggested that the qui tam process
introduces its own major capture problem.6 9 The DOJ has less of the
coziness with the oil executives it sues than the MMS does. But once you
introduce the qui tam mechanism, you introduce a different coziness that
comes from many qui tam relators' counsel being former DOJ lawyers and
future employers of current DOJ lawyers. This is the classic revolving
door problem. v
Moreover, it is the abuses that the MMS did know about that should
worry us most. If a federal agency is sitting on information that is in its
possession and either doing nothing or doing too little, that is a good
signal of some agency problem. And if coziness is the problem, we might
think that the mishandling of existing investigations would be common.
But the FCA essentially excludes these cases from plaintiffs power and
judicial oversight. As a practical matter, the whistleblower has to acquire
the relevant information from outside of the agency. A media report that
the agency is sitting on information would be a public disclosure that bars
suit by anyone without independent information. Similarly, a
whistleblower who identified the case through a FOIA request would be
barred from independently proceeding as a whistleblower.71 This leaves no
room for outside whistleblowers to police agency enforcement. For
example, in the MMS context, the Department of Interior's investigative
report uncovered a scheme where lucrative contracts were being awarded
improperly with major conflicts of interest. In several cases the

67. Oil Brokers Sex Scandal May Affect Drilling Debate, USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 2008, 10:18
AM), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-09-11-oil-scandal-drilling
N.htm (quoting from investigative report by Interior Department).
68. Of course, the DOJ could itself be captured and putting pressure on the MMS. But the facts
of the cases suggest the problem was precisely the opposite. See id.
69. See Engstrom, supra note 19, at 1251-52.
70. Engstrom attempts to test these claims with new empirical data. See id.
71. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel.
Kirk, 131 S.Ct. 1885 (2011).
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Department of Justice declined to prosecute the offenders .2 There was
nothing that qui tam relators could do about that. These conflicts would be
hard to fit under a false claims act violation. But, more fundamentally, no
whistleblower could qualify as an original source of information that had
already been disclosed in a government report.
Concerns of political influence where capture is occurring higher up
the chain are rampant in the Lance Armstrong case. Allegations of
attempts to capture government officials have circled the case for years.
Some allege that a federal criminal investigation was dropped against him
under odd circumstances . Moreover, one Congressman appeared to be
using his influence to stop the United States Anti Doping Agency
(USADA) from investigating Lance Armstrong.
In response to the
allegations and proceedings USADA brought against Armstrong and his
affiliates, the Congressman asked for the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) to investigate the use of taxpayer funds given to
USADA. The letter requesting the investigation included a lengthy
defense of Armstrong including the oft-repeated (but false) recitation that
Armstrong had never failed a drug test even though he had been tested
over 500 times. 6 Disappointed with the response from ONDCP and the
continued investigation, the Congressman somewhat ominously
announced: "I will continue to follow USADA's activities with interest.",77

72. Emma Schwartz, No More Sex, Drugs, and Gifts, ABC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2008), http://abc
news.go.com/Blotter/story?id=5836045.

73. It might be argued that the political system provides the appropriate check on the DOI's or
DOJ's failure to pursue claims in these cases. But the same political mechanism would work if the
FCA placed the DOI or DOJ rather than the relator in charge of prosecuting whistleblower claims.
74. Reed Albergotti, Armstrong Lobbying Targeted Investigator, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2013,
5:48 PM), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732444910457831194185128

4534.html (lobbying firm was hired on Armstrong's behalf to raise questions about the FDA
investigation); Pete Yost, Influence Game: Armstrong Lobbying Cycle, AP's THE BIG STORY (July 17,
2012, 4:35 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/influence-game-armstrongs-lobbying-cycle (noting the
influence Armstrong had on Congress); Report: Armstrong's Influence Extends Beyond Sport,
CYCLINGNEWS.COM (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/report-armstrongs-influenceextends-beyond-sport (same).
75. Christian Red, USADA's Lance Armstrong Probe Met with Opposition by Politicians
Including CongressmanJim Sensenbrenner,N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 17, 2012, 8:47 PM), available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-team/armstrong-probe-thwarted-politics-article- 1.1186090.
76. Letter from Congressman Sensenbrenner to ONDCP (July 12, 2012), available at
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentlD=303025. As has now been
established, the statement that Armstrong never failed a test was false. See Oprah and Lance
Armstrong: The Worldwide Exclusive, (OWN television broadcast Jan. 17 & 18, 2013), available at
http://www.oprah.com/own tv/onc/lance-armstrong-one.html.
77. Statement of Congressman Sensenbrenner (Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://sensenbrenner.
house.gov/news/documentprint.aspx?DocumentlD=303025 (statement in response to the Office of

Nat'l Drug Control Policy's reply to the Congressman's inquiry into the roughly $9 million in taxpayer
funds given to the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency).
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Again, none of these agency problems can be addressed by qui tam
litigation. The conflicts relate to investigations that are beyond the reach of
the FCA. Floyd Landis has no ability to prosecute a federal criminal
investigation against Armstrong. Only the civil allegations about the USPS
contract, of which Landis has independent knowledge, could have gone
forward without government approval. But if the qui tam mechanism is
about curbing agency problems, we should grant individuals the right to
bring suits whenever there is a potential conflict, not just where
information resides outside of the regulators' possession. We do not see
that. Instead, the mechanism is only employed where the supposedly
captured agent is presented with information that he or she has likely
never seen before.
We might even think we trust the captured agent more when the
information is new and comes only from a whistleblower. The surprise at
the information, and the possibility that the whistleblower will go public
against the captured agent as well should serve as an incentive to prosecute
that is not present in other cases.
The arguments for not allowing private citizens to prosecute all
government claims (criminal or civil) in the face of a conflict of interest
include avoiding interference with government functioning and a
deference to the political process. Again, those apply equally in the
whistleblower context. The DFA prevents individuals from interfering
with the SEC's enforcement process and there may be political
ramifications if the SEC ignores whistleblowers. The same should be true
for the MMS. In some sense, the SEC is less politically accountable than
the MMS and the DOI and more susceptible to pressure from the
industry, suggesting that the DFA and FCA mechanisms are inaptly
designed. Under an agency-capture theory, qui tam mechanisms should be
more desirable when the agency is independent and not politically
accountable. 9
All of this is to say that the existing justifications for preferring an FCA
mechanism to a DFA mechanism are unsatisfactory.80 It is not clear that

78. See sources cited supra note 65.
79. This is true if we think that the capture is coming from the industry representatives who deal
with the agency. The opposite would be true if we think inappropriate influence is coming from the
White House or the DOJ.

80. There are other justifications based more on psychological benefits for whistleblowers that
we do not address. Geoffrey Rapp, for example, criticizes the DFA regime for not providing bounties
when the damages against the fraudulent party are less than $1 million. See Rapp, supra note 19, at
92-95, 143-44. Rapp also notes that a qui tam action would have provided plaintiffs with a forum to
be heard. Id. at 78. The argument is based on the behavioral psychology approach that suggests
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there is anything unique about a whistleblower case that raises additional
concerns about agency capture than other roles played by agencies. And
we do not see many proposals to hand the entire administrative state over
to the courts.81 It has also been noted that agency-capture problems are
likely to be present within the qui tam mechanism as well. 82 Resourceconstraint arguments fall to a similar challenge. If qui tam cases encourage
claims that an agency cannot prosecute because of resource constraints, it
is difficult to justify using that mechanism only when the agency does not
possess the relevant information. This is equally unlikely.8 3
We should not take this critique as a reason to embrace the DFA over
the FCA. There is, as we show in Part II, a stronger justification for the
FCA mechanism design. It has nothing to do with agency capture. Rather,
it is all about information screening. And we suggest, even with all of the
faith in the SEC as being trustworthy beyond reproach, the FCA provides
a better mechanism than the DFA for dealing with whistleblower cases.
We are not the first to critique the new DFA whistle-blowing regime for
omitting qui tam provisions. Other commentators, however, have focused
on aspects other than the screening benefits that qui tam would have
provided.84 We demonstrate the advantage of the FCA's procedures in
screening information in the next part.
II. SCREENING THE QUALITY OF A WHISTLEBLOWER'S INFORMATION
Many benefits and costs of whistle-blowing are common to both the
DFA and the FCA. The key distinction between the two is that under the
FCA, an informant brings the information to the attention of the
government through a private qui tam action; under the DFA, an informant
anonymously brings information to the regulatory agency.
In this section, we develop a model to illustrate that qui tam actions in
the FCA provide a useful mechanism for screening the quality of a

whistleblowers are motivated by more than just money. This is no doubt true. Rapp uses experimental
evidence to suggest that qui tam gives whistleblowers "a chance to tell their stories and to restore their
reputations." See id.
81. Nor is it obvious that there is anything unique about judicial oversight that makes it the only
solution to regulatory-capture problems. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 58.
82. See Engstrom, supra note 19 (examining DOJ regulatory capture within the FCA regime).
83. Many proposals for private bidding on the right to pursue actions for others provide a
mechanism for providing financing for profitable lawsuits that may not be pursued because of resource
constraints that limit litigation. Nothing in the system requires that a resource constrained entity also
be information constrained. See infra text accompanying notes 158-66 for a discussion of these
dynamics in the context of shareholder derivative suits.
84. See supra notes 18-20.
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whistleblower's information. We show that increasing the rewards for
informing or decreasing the private cost of informing-such as the regime
provided for under the DFA-dilutes the quality of the information
brought forward. We also show the counter-intuitive result that increasing
the rewards to whistleblowers may lead to an increase in the underlying
fraud. Our model builds on rich law and economics literature exploring the
differences between litigation and regulation. This literature, however, has
largely focused on the effectiveness of ex post litigation compared to ex
ante regulation. 5 The ex ante regulation of corporate fraud in the United
8 6
States before the DFA was commonly critiqued for its ineffectiveness.
Here, our model departs from this literature by exploring the deterrent
effects of two different forms of ex post litigation.
A. Screening as a Solution to the Problem of Hidden Information in
Whistle-blowing
The hidden information problem is illustrated by George Akerlof's
classic example of the market for second-hand cars.8 7 The seller of a
second-hand car knows whether the product is high quality or whether it is
low quality (i.e., a "lemon"). The buyer, on the other hand, is poorly
informed. He cannot determine, without incurring high cost, whether the
car is a lemon or not. This hidden information causes the market to
unravel. That is, bad cars "drive out" the good cars, because the two types
of cars sell for the same price. This "lemons problem" is pervasive in all
aspects of a market economy where one side of the market is better
informed than the other.88

85. See, e.g., Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input
and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEG. STUDIES 193 (1977); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus
Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEG. STUDIES 357 (1984); Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of
Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. OF ECON. 271 (1984); Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei
Shleifer, An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation, 56 J. OF L. & ECON. 1 (2013); REGULATION VS.
LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011); ANDREI

(2012).
86. See Rapp, supra note 19; Dyck et al., supra note 18.
87. In the early 1970s, economists generated models illustrating how asymmetric information

SHLEIFER, THE FAILURE OF JUDGES AND THE RISE OF REGULATORS

can distort the efficiency of markets. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for "'Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970).

88. For example, how does a potential employer know whether a job candidate is productive or
lazy? The job candidate has a far better idea about her own productivity than the firm does. The
information asymmetry means that a highly productive worker is treated as an unproductive worker;
she is offered a wage that is below her worth. From a theoretical perspective, see generally DOUGLAS
G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 153-56 (1994).
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There are two actions that can help alleviate the problem of asymmetric
information: signaling and screening. Signaling takes place when the
better-informed side of the market takes steps to indicate their type to the
less-informed side of the market.89 That is, individuals with better
information can signal their type.
Screening is closely linked to signaling, but it differs in one key
respect. In a signaling model, the better-informed player moves first to
send a signal to the less well-informed player of their attributes. In a
screening model, the less well-informed player moves first. For example, a
hiring firm can screen the productivity of workers by offering higher
wages for candidates with higher educational levels. 90 In screening
models, the party with poorer information sets up a screen in order to
determine the type of the better-informed party. It is a mechanism by
which the less well-informed party can extract private information from
the better-informed party.
The lemons problem arises in the context of whistle-blowing. The
government cannot determine the quality of a whistleblower's information
without engaging in a costly investigation. But this does not mean that the
government should simply rely on ex ante regulation. Rather, the
government can screen the information that a whistleblower brings
forward.
Ex ante regulation of fraudulent behavior is often difficult and
expensive. In the context of the FCA and government procurement, the
federal government contracts for a wide variety of goods and services
ranging from computers to aircraft carriers, from construction materials to
medical services through Medicare reimbursements. The federal
government spends over a trillion dollars each year on discretionary

89. In the second-hand car example, the dealer may distinguish between high- and low-quality
cars by offering longer warranties for high-quality cars. The longer the warranty is signaling that the
car is high quality.

90. In 1973, Michael Spence illustrated that an individual's education level can operate as a
signal for productivity. Imagine that there are two types of people: productive workers and
unproductive workers. An unproductive worker has a higher cost of completing more years of
education than the productive worker. Consequently, a productive worker can signal their type to
potential employers by undertaking more years of education. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling,
87 Q. J. OF ECON. 355 (1973). For these contributions to economics, George Akerlof and Michael
Spence (along with Joseph Stiglitz, another prominent economist who studied problems of asymmetric
information) were awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics. See Press Release, Nobelprize.org,
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2001 (Oct. 10, 2001),
available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/200 1/press.html.
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spending.91 In the context of the DFA and SEC regulation, there are, on
average, about 2.7 billion trades made per day on the New York Stock
Exchange.92 Analyzing and regulating every single contract, transaction, or
document for evidence of fraud is simply not practicable or cost
effective. 93 Some evidence on the ineffectiveness of ex ante regulation in
detecting fraud might be reflected in the fact that the SEC detected only
seven percent of alleged major corporate scandals between 1996 and
2004.94
To use resources more efficiently, government regulators often seek to
rely on information provided by whistleblowers that have better
information about the existence of fraud.95 As noted above, however, the
government must contend with the problem of hidden information. The
government does not know, ex ante, how strong the whistleblower's
information is. On one hand, the whistleblower could have high-quality
information. She may have actually been involved in the fraud or she may
be privy to sensitive information about how the fraud was conducted. On
the other hand, the whistleblower may be poorly informed and have lowquality information. The employee may not understand the nature of the
behavior or what constitutes fraud. The whistleblower's information may
not establish the merits of the claim. Alternatively, the whistleblower may
have a vendetta against the firm and over-blow the quality of information
she knows is weak. Put simply, the government regulator finds it difficult
to determine whether a whistleblower's information is high-quality
information or whether the information is a lemon.
Consider the following example. A former employee of a healthcare
provider approaches the government regulator and informs them that his
former employer has been making excessive and inaccurate claims for
Medicare reimbursements. The government regulator is unable to assess,

91. In fiscal year 2012, discretionary spending by the federal government was $1.285 trillion,
slightly less than the $1.344 trillion requested in the budget. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET
AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2013 To 2023 (2013).
92. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., http://www.nyse.com/financials/-1022221393023.html#dlyvolume
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
93. On the inefficiency of ex ante regulatory enforcement costs, see Steven Shavell, A
Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule over Regulation (Harvard John M.
Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 731, Sept. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.

com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 2144553.
94. See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate
Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2214 (2010).
95. According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), over forty percent of
fraud detection occurs as a result of tips. See ASS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, 2010 REPORT

TO THE NATIONS, available at http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE Website/Contentldocuments/
rttn-2010.pdf (last visited May 31, 2014).
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ex ante, whether the former employee genuinely has inside information
that fraud has been committed, has an unfounded hunch, or is simply using
a weak signal to seek revenge against his former employers.96 The
government cannot know the quality of the information the whistleblower
has without engaging in a costly investigation.
Whistle-blowing laws are enacted with the express purpose of inducing
parties with private information about socially costly dishonest or illegal
behavior to come forward to the poorly informed government. The
government seeks a mechanism that encourages whistleblowers with highquality information to come forward but at the same time, discourages
whistleblowers with low-quality information from coming forward.
Investigations of claims made by low-quality informants are a waste of
society's resources.
In the next section, we illustrate how a qui tam mechanism screens out
low-quality information with a simple game-theory model.
B. The Model of Screening
Here, we sketch our model that captures the essence of a screening
mechanism of the FCA whistle-blowing scheme. We start with two
foundational assumptions and then later discuss what happens when those
assumptions are relaxed. First, we assume that the deterrence is a proper
and dominant goal of these anti-fraud statutes. This is consistent with the
public rhetoric and legislative history surrounding both statutes.9 Second,
as is customary, we assume a rational actor framework. The impact of
imposing costs and offering rewards will obviously differ if
whistleblowers or those committing fraud are not rational. This is not to
say, however, that our model cannot account for non-pecuniary costs and
rewards. A whistleblower may get value from morality, indignation, or
revenge. As with any other payoff that value must be considered when
designing the correct cost-reward dynamic.

96. For literature on revenge as a motive see Engstrom, supra note 19, at 1275 n.109 (collecting
sources).
97. That being said, the same conclusions hold if we assume a dominant punitive goal. Other
theories of punishment may focus on factors such as the expressive power of law to make certain rules
more salient, provide behavioral focal points, or to otherwise shift norms. See generally Richard H.
McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1649 (2000). Our model does not
address those facets of anti-fraud law.
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1. The Decision to Commit Fraud(Firms)
Let's first examine the potential for a firm to engage in socially costly
fraudulent behavior. Much of the academic literature on qui tam actions
starts from the assumption that fraud has occurred. 98 From an economic
perspective, however, the whistleblower scheme only provides value if it
deters socially costly fraudulent behavior. This deterrent effect is explicit
in our model.
Consider an example of fraudulent behavior that could be captured
under the FCA. Firms make the decision whether or not to commit fraud
when contracting with the government. The economy has 1000
government contracts to supply various building materials. Each contract
is worth $20 million. These 1000 contacts are awarded to 1000 different
suppliers in the economy, who comprise a subset of a larger number of
potential suppliers. Each firm has the option to fraudulently misrepresent
the quality of the building materials used by the firm.
Assume that there are two types of firms: efficient firms and inefficient
firms. Efficient firms have a low cost of supplying high-quality materials.
Assume that they receive no private benefit from fraudulently
misrepresenting the quality of their materials. These efficient firms make
up ninety percent of all firms. The inefficient firms, on the other hand, can
privately benefit from fraudulent behavior if their fraudulent behavior
remains undetected. By misrepresenting the quality of their product, they
stand to gain $6 million. These inefficient firms make up about ten percent
of all firms. This fraudulent behavior is costly to society as a whole.
Assume each case of fraudulent behavior in each contract costs society
$10 million. This social cost comes from the misallocation of resources,
mismatching of contracting partners, and procurement of substandard
materials. 99
While fraudulent contracting is socially costly, the government agency
or regulatory body investigating fraud does not have the resources to
investigate all 1000 government contracts. Assume the government agency
is afforded a budget of $50 million to investigate fraud and each
investigation costs the agency $1 million. If the agency chooses to spend
the $1 million, they will know with certainty whether or not fraud has
been committed. If fraud has been committed, the case against the
dishonest firm is clear and the information is verifiable before a court of

98.
99.

See supra Part 1.
See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 330 (2004).
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law. The agency can only investigate fifty claims, at most, under the
budgetary restrictions. For simplicity, assume that if the government
agency tries to spread the budget across more than fifty cases, and spends
less than $1 million on any one investigation, the probability of accurately
detecting fraud falls to zero. We further assume that if an inefficient firm
is investigated and found guilty of making fraudulent claims against the
government, the firm pays damages of $20 million (or, is simply forced to
pay back the contract money).10 0
In a first, best world-where the government agency investigating
fraud has perfect information and can distinguish between an efficient firm
and an inefficient firm-there would be no problem of fraud. The agency
would simply restrict its investigations to the 100 inefficient firms,
increasing the likelihood of being detected to fifty percent. (Recall that
there are only fifty investigations). When the probability of detection is
fifty percent, the expected damages are $10 million (fifty percent of the
$20 million damages). This is far greater than the $6 million of private
benefit that an inefficient firm can stand to gain from committing fraud. 101
As a consequence, inefficient firms will be truthful about the costs of their
materials and will be less likely to win government contracts. Fraudulent
behavior is deterred.
The problem of fraud, however, exists when the government agency
does not have perfect information. If the agency has weak ex ante
information about which firms are committing fraud, it may perhaps
randomly selecting fifty of the 1000 contracts to investigate. The
likelihood of a fraudulent firm getting caught is now just five percent. The
expected damages that a fraudulent, inefficient firm will have to pay,
therefore, are only $1 million (five percent of $20 million). Given that the
private benefit of committing
fraud is $6 million, it is in their private
10 2
interests to commit fraud.
In the equilibrium outcome here, all inefficient firms commit fraud.
The inefficient firms know that the government agency may simply
randomize; they know that the agency cannot ex ante detect which firms
are potential fraudsters. The social cost of this fraudulent behavior is high.

100. Under the FCA, treble damages may be awarded. The fact that the government could claim
up to $60 million here does not change the substance of the screening mechanism described below; it
merely affects the height of the hurdles.
101. If the government has perfect information as to the efficiency of the firm at the front end of
the contracting process, then there would be no problem of fraud in the first place. The inefficient
firms would simply not win contracts over efficient firms.
102. It also follows that an efficient firm will never commit fraud under these assumptions. The
efficient firm generates no private benefit from committing fraud.
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Not only will inefficient firms commit fraud, but the government agency
also wastes $40 million investigating claims against efficient firms. This
misallocation of the regulator's investigation resources may attract further
costs as efficient firms waste resources to defend themselves against nonmeritorious investigations. This may discourage efficient firms from
contracting with the government in the future.10 3
In order to better distinguish between efficient and inefficient firms, the
government agency seeks to rely on inside information from individual
employees of these firms. But that information is only useful if it is
accurate. For example, the government may get 100 accurate inside reports
of fraud tips and 400 inaccurate inside reports based on weak information.
If the government cannot distinguish the tips, it has to randomly choose
fifty of the firms to investigate. In expectation those fifty investigations
will lead to ten fraudulent firms (or twenty percent) being caught. The
expected penalty for fraudulent firms will be $4 million (twenty percent of
$20 million), and they will not be deterred.
The next subsection looks at the incentives whistleblowers have to
come forward with these tips.
2. The Decision to Blow the Whistle (Informants)
In our model, an employee at each of these firms may receive private
information about whether his firm has committed fraud. The individual
receives a signal that is either strong or weak. The strong signal of fraud
may be seeing a smoking gun document that outlines how the firm has
dishonestly contracted with the government. The weak signal of fraud may
simply be rumor or hearsay about dishonest or fraudulent dealings.
Employees at any type of firm-efficient or inefficient-can receive a
weak signal of fraud. These weak signals are evenly distributed across all
firms. We will assume the signal is correct only ten percent of the time.
Only employees of inefficient and fraudulent firms, however, can receive a
strong signal. That is, if an employee receives a strong signal that fraud is
occurring, he has strong information that the firm is inefficient and has
committed fraud. We assume that each employee knows the quality of his
own information. He knows whether the information is strong or weak and
he knows the likelihood that the information is correct. Put simply, he
knows the probability the claim of fraud will be successfully proven.

103. These arguments against the FCA have been made before in the literature. See, e.g., William
E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in Government Procurement
Markets, 6 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 201 (1998). The problem will be even greater under the DFA.
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The government agency investigating fraud can harness the employee's
inside information about fraud to help overcome their information
deficiencies. There are two problems, however, that the government must
address if seeking to incentivize whistle-blowing behavior. First, the
government agency cannot ex ante determine the quality of the
information that is brought before them by the whistleblower. The
employee makes a claim, but the government cannot determine whether
the individual has received a strong signal of fraud or a weak signal of
fraud. In order to verify the information, the10 government
must launch a
4
full-scale investigation at a cost of $1 million.
Second, there is a private cost that an individual employee must bear
when blowing the whistle on fraudulent behavior. These costs include
potential retaliation by the employer or restrictions on promotions or other
employment opportunities in the future. Many whistleblowers either lose
their job or are demoted. These private costs will be discussed in greater
detail below.10 5 For now, let's assume that the whistleblower estimates
these costs to be $250,000. There are two ways for the government to
improve the benefit-cost balance. One way is to minimize the cost of
blowing the whistle by ensuring anonymity and confidentiality. Another
method is to increase the benefit side of the equation by compensating the
whistleblower for any losses he may incur if he does provide the
information.10 6 Consistent with the economic literature, we assume that the
government can incentivize individuals with financial reward; if the
whistleblower expects to receive at least $250,000 in compensation, he
will be incentivized to come forward.1 0 7 In the next sub-section, we model
the institutional framework of different types of whistle-blowing schemes
to illustrate the benefits of qui tam actions.

104. We assume that this investigation cost of the government is constant and there is no
difference between the cost of investigating a tip that comes directly to the agency and the cost of
investigating the veracity of a claim made by an individual in a suit.
105. See infra Part J1.B.3.b.
106. The economics literature on rewards-and rewards from private enforcement-is vast. The
underlying incentive of the agent responding to a reward is at the heart of the rational actor model in
law and economics. In the context of private enforcement, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION
STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES 21-31 (2010)
(discussing the incentive structure of litigation).
107. As noted below, there may be different types of information about fraud where individuals
are willing to provide tips for free. See infra Part III.
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3. The Structure of Whistle-Blowing Laws (Government)
In our model, the government agency investigating fraud recognizes
that whistleblowers must be financially incentivized to blow the whistle.
In this sub-section, we explore different institutional options open to the
government.
a. FinancialReward Schemes
Let's first spell out why a "flat fee" or fixed payment made to every
employee who blows the whistle will not work. If the government agency
offers $250,000 to any employee who has received a signal of fraud, all
potential whistleblowers that receive a signal-weak or strong-will come
forward.10 8 This incentive scheme will generate too much whistle-blowing:
The government will not be able to ex ante distinguish between wellinformed whistleblowers and poorly informed whistleblowers. This
generates what is known as a "pooling" effect10 9 : employees with weak
information are treated the same as employees with strong information.
The flat fee fails to separate good information from bad.
Next, let's consider the effects of making the payment to the
whistleblower conditional upon a successful finding of fraud. Under both
the FCA and the DFA, the whistleblower is entitled to a portion of the
damages that the government receives. Making payment conditional upon
success can operate as a screen. Informants with high-quality information
will be incentivized to bring their information to the attention of the
government agency. On the other hand, informants with weak information
will be less inclined to blow the whistle, because the expected benefits are
lower." ° The expected benefit is a function of the likelihood of success
and individuals with strong information, therefore, have a higher expected
reward than individuals with weak information. The government is able to

108. Our model assumes that individuals receive a signal before coming forward as a
whistleblower. We assume that a fabricated signal can easily be identified as such and penalties for
fraud will deter such behavior. The key is that the weak signal, from the government's view, might be
a strong signal. The same is not true when individuals receive no signal.
109. In game-theory literature pooling occurs when different types of individuals behave the same
way. Here, those employees who receive a weak signal act the same way as those employees who
receive a strong signal. See, e.g., JOEL WATSON, STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
282-92 (2001); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY

Ch. 9 &11 (4th ed. 2007); ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, & JERRY R. GREEN,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY Ch. 13 (1995).
110. Whistleblowers know that the expected benefits are lower when the information is weak
because, while the reward is the same for both types, the probability of winning the reward is much
lower for whistleblowers with weaker information.

2014]

NOISE REDUCTION: THE SCREENING VALUE OF QUI TAM

1195

set up a screen that whistleblowers with strong information will clear, but
whistleblowers with weak information will not. This generates a
"separating" equilibrium. 1 1
But this separating equilibrium is not guaranteed by simply making the
whistleblower's payment contingent upon success. If the contingent
payment is too low, then there will be a pooling equilibrium: no
individuals will come forward. There will be, therefore, no deterrent effect
of the whistle-blowing law and inefficient firms will continue to commit
fraud. For example, let's say in our model that the government offered a
bounty of just one percent of any damages to the whistleblower. This will
incentivize neither informants with weak information nor informants with
strong information to come forward. Whistleblowers with strong
information bear a cost of $250,000, but have an expected benefit of just
one percent of $20,000,000 ($200,000). The expected bounty is not
sufficiently high to incentivize whistle-blowing behavior. The expected
reward for whistleblowers with weak information is even lower.11 2 The
effect of a pooling equilibrium on the decision of a firm to commit fraud is
clear. With no whistle-blowing behavior, inefficient firms are not deterred
from engaging in fraudulent behavior.
We can observe a separating equilibrium by increasing the reward.
Under this equilibrium, only an informant with strong information will
come forward. The expected benefits now outweigh the costs. An
informant with weak information knows that the cost of blowing the
whistle outweighs any expected cut of the damages from any successful
fraud claim. Since only informants with high-quality information come
forward, the government can focus its efforts on these claims of fraud.
This increases the likelihood that an inefficient firm committing fraud will
be caught.
In our model, suppose that the government offers ten percent of any
damages to the whistleblower. Whistleblowers with strong information
have an expected reward of $2 million. This more than covers the cost of
blowing the whistle. Whistleblowers with weak information, however, will
not be induced to come forward. Those with weak information have only a
ten percent chance of recovery and so they will value the chance of a

111. In game-theory literature, a separating equilibrium is where individuals of different types
behave differently. Here, a separating equilibrium is desirable when those employees with strong
information come forward; but those employees with weak information do not.
112. Here, a whistleblower with weak information has only a ten percent chance of success. The
expected reward, therefore, for a whistleblower with weak information is ten percent x one percent x
$20 million = $20,000.
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reward at $200,000. Under the conditions of the model, only
whistleblowers with strong information will come forward.
This enhanced ability to screen information deters fraud. By increasing
the likelihood of detection, inefficient firms are discouraged from acting
dishonestly. No inefficient firm will commit fraud provided a sufficiently
high proportion of employees of inefficient firms receive a strong
signal.1 13
The relationship between increasing rewards and increasing deterrence
is not monotonic, however. If the rewards are too high, then
whistleblowers with weak signals will be incentivized to come forward.
For example, increasing the rewards can encourage disgruntled employees
with poor information to blow the whistle in the hope of hitting the jackpot
(recall that ten percent of weak signals will result in recovery). Once
again, we have a pooling equilibrium; but this time, too many informants
come forward. 114 If the success-contingent payment to whistleblowers is
too high, then the institutional structure begins to resemble the fixed-fee
system described above.
In our model, if a whistleblower is entitled to twenty-five percent of the
damages awarded against the fraudulent firm then all employees who
receive a signal-weak or strong-will come forward. Whistleblowers
with weak information will come forward because the expected reward
(ten percent of $5 million) 115 exceeds the cost of blowing the whistle. As
with the flat-fee incentive structure, the government cannot ex ante
distinguish between well-informed whistleblowers and poorly informed
whistleblowers. The regulator is faced with the problem of information
overload.
Excessive contingent payments not only dilute the quality of the
information, but they have an ancillary effect of reducing the deterrence.
We are left with a rather perverse result that increasing the rewards to
potential whistleblowers can actually encourage firms to commit fraud.

113. Let's say, for example, that an employee in fifty percent of inefficient firms receives a strong
signal if fraud is actually committed. The agency, therefore, receives reports from fifty whistleblowers.
All the whistleblowers that come forward received a strong signal. The likelihood of a fraudulent
inefficient firm being investigated is, therefore, fifty percent. The expected cost of committing fraud,
therefore, is $10 million (fifty percent of the $20 million damages), while the benefit is $6 million. No
inefficient firm will commit fraud under these conditions.
114. See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 21, at 1172.
115. To be clear, the expected reward is ten percent x twenty-five percent x $20 million
$500,000. This is greater than the cost incurred.
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The argument, here, essentially follows from the116
idea that greater accuracy
in the legal process generates greater deterrence.
These equilibria are illustrated graphically in Figure 1. If the reward is
low (i.e., less than the threshold hurdle S), then no one will be incentivized
to come forward. If the reward is increased to an amount between S and
W, only informants with strong information come forward. This reward
scheme deters fraud. Increasing the reward beyond the hurdle W, however,
has deleterious effects. This incentivizes all whistleblowers to come
forward and dilutes the quality of the information. This information
overload reduces the deterrence effect and can produce greater incentive to
commit fraud.
More generally, assume that the damages awarded against the firm are
D, the percentage awarded to the whistleblower is r, and the cost of
blowing the whistle is c. The probability of victory in a particular claim
against the firm is p and is known by the whistleblower. Under these
assumptions, a whistleblower will be incentivized into blowing the whistle
if r> c/pD. There are two types of informants-those with weak
information with probability of victory pw, and those with strong
information with probability of victory p,. The threshold percentage of
damages required to encourage strong informants is S = c/pD. The
threshold percentage of damages where weak117 informants will also be
encouraged is W = c/pD. It follows that W> S.

116. This argument follows from a familiar result in the law and economics literature that the
deterrent effect of law is reduced as the likelihood of inaccuracy in the legal system-either Type I or
Type II errors-increases. As Type II errors-that is, the likelihood of a guilty party being found not
guilty-increase, the likelihood of punishment is reduced. Therefore, parties are more likely to commit
crimes. As Type I errors-that is, the likelihood of an innocent party being found guilty-increase, the
relative cost of committing a crime is reduced. Therefore, parties are more likely to commit crimes.
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determinationof Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON.
191 (1996); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J.

LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994). Here, in our model, we have only Type II errors. That is, inefficient and
fraudulent firms are less likely to be found guilty of fraud when the regulator must randomize which
firms to investigate because it has received too many tips. Given that they are less likely to be found
guilty, the likelihood of committing fraud increases; this is in spite of the increase in the quantity of
information flowing to the regulator.
117. Under our assumptions that D = $20 million, c = $2 5 0,000, pw = 0.1, and p, = 1, we get the
following thresholds: S = 1/80 and W = 1/8. That is, if the whistleblower receives less than 1/80th of
the $20 million damages, there is a pooling equilibrium: no one blows the whistle. If the whistleblower
receives more than 1/8 of the damages, there is a pooling equilibrium: every employee who receives a
signal blows the whistle. If the reward falls between these thresholds, only those with good
information come forward. Such rewards optimize the deterrent effect of whistle-blowing.
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FIGURE 1
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The deterrent effect of a whistleblower scheme is a function of the reward given to the
whistleblower. If the reward is too high, it can reduce the deterrent effect.

The impact that a pooling equilibrium has on enforcement and
deterrence should not be underestimated. If the whistleblowers pool on the
left side of Figure 1, then the government has no tips to use in
investigating firms. The best the government can do is investigate
randomly. This lowers enforcement to five percent and deters no fraud. If
the whistleblowers pool on the right side of Figure 1, then everyone with a
weak signal blows the whistle. A firm that commits fraud faces no
sanction from being the subject of a tip. Because the government is
overwhelmed with tips, it does not have the resources to differentiate
strong tips from weak tips and chooses randomly from the tips. The
whistleblower can do nothing to differentiate its tip as strong because the
government does not have the resources to verify.
Of course in the real world things are not so simple or binary. Some
tips will be laughable. Others will be slam-dunks. But as long as there
remains a large category of "plausible" cases, the lack of screening creates
a cost. The government might look for indicia of strong tips. But as more
tips come in, it will be harder to differentiate among the plausible tips, and
it will be more costly for the government to examine the indicia closely.
The measures will be more superficial, less verifiable, and more likely to
produce false positives and false negatives.
The Bernie Madoff scandal provides a demonstration of this exact
phenomenon. Even before the DFA, the SEC's limited resources required
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them to be selective in choosing which tips to investigate. But their
selection criteria were crude at best. Over nine years, Harry Markopolos
provided the SEC with information about the Madoff scheme. The returns
Madoff was achieving were unheard of. And at one point, Markopolos
demonstrated that there were not enough options existing in the world for
Madoff to be running the strategy he claimed. Madoff's operations were
mathematically impossible. 1 8
Mathematical impossibility, however, was not one of the SEC's criteria
for measuring the credibility of a tip. As Markopolos notes, the SEC
basically determined, "the only way I would qualify as a whistleblower is
if I came in with a tape recording of Bernie Madoff admitting he was
running a Ponzi scheme . ... Obviously, I didn't have that tape, and if I
did I wouldn't have needed the SEC."'1 19
b. Reducing the Cost of Blowing the Whistle

Individuals seeking to blow the whistle on fraudulent behavior may
bear a high private cost of blowing the whistle. For example, the
whistleblower may be threatened with retaliation that can come in the
form of reduced opportunities for promotion, losing their job, or perhaps
even threatened with criminal proceedings for their part in the fraudulent
behavior.
Consider the following two examples. First, a group of eleven
employees and former employees of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) complained in letters to Congress that the FDA uses intimidation
and coercion tactics in order to gain approval for unsafe or defective
medical devices used to screen for cancer. These allegations were
published on the front page of the New York Times. 120 Six of the
whistleblowers subsequently brought a claim in the federal courts alleging
that the FDA retaliated by unlawfully reading e-mails and, in some cases,
terminating employment. 121

118. Oversight of the SEC's Failure to Identify the BernardL. Madoff Ponzi Scheme and How to
Improve SEC Performance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs,
l Ilth Cong. 30, 60 (2009) (statement of Harry Markopolos); Assessing the MadoffPonzi Scheme and
Regulatory Failures:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on CapitalMkts., Ins. & Gov 't Sponsored Enters.
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., l ilth Cong. 5, 101 (2009) (statement of Harry Markopolos).
119. Interview by Steve Inskeep with Harry Markopolos (Mar. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 124208012.
120. Harris Gardiner, Scientists Say F.D.A. Ignored Warnings on Radiation Exposure, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, at A14.
121. Second Amended Complaint, Paul Hardy v. Margaret Hamburg, No. 1:11 -CV-01739-RLW
(D.D.C. July 17, 2012).

1200

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:1169

Second, in light of a report that soccer referees had been fixing soccer
matches in China, the Chinese Football Association offered amnesty and
122
anonymity to any corrupt referees who admitted match-fixing behavior.
The chief referee, Gong Jianping, came forward and detailed the links
between soccer officials, referees, and illegal gambling rings. The Chinese
Football Association went against their word; they had Gong Jianping
arrested and he was sentenced to ten years in prison. He died eighteen
months later. 123
Such potential costs of retaliation, no doubt, loom large in the decision
of the individual to blow the whistle. The larger these costs, the less likely
individuals will be to blow the whistle. A common argument in both the
legal academic literature and popular press is that the government can
further cultivate and encourage whistle-blowing by guaranteeing
anonymity of the informant and preventing any possible retaliation against
the whistleblower. 124 Protecting whistleblowers against such retaliation

undoubtedly has the effect of encouraging whistle-blowing.1 25 But the
protection may reduce the ability of the regulator to screen the quality of
the information-at least when the level of the reward and other costs are
not considered or adjusted when designing the protection.

122. There is an extensive, game-theoretic literature on the use of leniency to encourage
whistleblowers to come forward. The literature is largely situated in the antitrust arena, where leniency
is given when a whistleblower informs about other members of a price-fixing cartel. The use of
leniency is sensible in this context because of the instability of any cartel. See, e.g., C6cile Aubert,
Patrick Rey, & William E. Kovacic, The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-Blowing Programs on
Cartels, 24 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 1241 (2006); Wouter P.J. Wils, Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement:
Theory and Practice, 30 WORLD COMPETITION 25 (2007). But see Edward M. Iacobucci, Cartel Class
Actions and Immunity Programmes, J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2013). Leniency may not have

the same effect in the context of fraud as it does in the context of antitrust. First, the equilibria of
fraudulent behavior are not inherently unstable, as it is in a cartel. Second, the leniency provisions only
work if the whistleblower can be protected against prosecution or other state punishment. In the
context of the FCA and the DFA, the individual whistleblower may not have committed any fraudulent
or dishonest act; there may be nothing that a leniency or immunity program could do to incentivize
coming forward.
123.

See, e.g., DECLAN HILL, THE FIX: SOCCER AND ORGANIZED CRIME 15 (2008).

124. See, e.g., Robert J. McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers, 3
WM. & MARY POL'Y REv., Spring 2012, at 184; ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLE-BLOWING: WHEN

IT WORKS-AND WHY (2003). For an example of recent media reports on drug use in Australian sport,
see also Adam Cooper, Whistleblowers Need Anonymity, THE AGE NEWSPAPER (Feb. 10, 2013),
available at http://www.theage.com.au/afl/afl-news/whistleblowers-need-anonymity-20130209-2e5dl.
html.
125. The idea of the need to protect federal employees who blow the whistle and report agency
misconduct from such retaliation is the basis of the Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101 -12, § 2, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) ("The purpose of this Act is to strengthen and improve protection
for the rights of Federal employees, to prevent reprisals, and to help eliminate wrongdoing within the
Government....").
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The private costs that whistleblowers bear play a vital role in
generating a separating equilibrium. To see why, let's return to our model.
We previously assumed that the cost of bringing the information to the
attention of the government agency is $250,000. But, let's say the
government seeks to further encourage whistle-blowing by reducing this
private cost. This lowers the hurdle that whistleblowers have to clear to
come forward with their information. If the government can guarantee
anonymity of the whistleblower and guarantee that there will be no
retaliation against the employee, then the costs may even fall to zero.
Decreasing the private cost of blowing the whistle has two effects.
First, it will encourage strong whistleblowers as the threshold S, in Figure
1, decreases. That is, whistleblowers with strong signals will be induced
by smaller rewards. Second, it can encourage too many whistleblowers. In
Figure 1, the threshold W also decreases. With a low cost of blowing the
whistle, more informants with weak signals will be encouraged to come
forward.
Reducing the cost of blowing the whistle to zero eliminates any
possibility of a separating equilibrium in our model. The threshold W in
Figure 1 will be located at 0. If whistleblowers receive any expected
benefit from coming forward-no matter how small-they blow the
whistle. This is true for employees with either weak or strong information.
Thus, reward schemes that allow whistleblowers to anonymously report
information to the regulator, such as that under the DFA, may merely
dilute the quality of the information and consequently fail to deter fraud.
In a perfect world, we could maximize the value of a screen by making
it costless for whistleblowers with strong information to come forward
while making it costly for whistleblowers with weak information. This
world of perfect separation does not exist. If, however, the costs of
blowing the whistle on non-meritorious claims were greater than the costs
of blowing the whistle on meritorious claims, then the likelihood of a
separating equilibrium increases. Loss-contingent costs can achieve this.
The effect of loss-contingent costs is illustrated in Figure 2. The
threshold W increases from Wo to W 1. This increases the gap between
S and W. If we represent the loss-contingent costs by k, then W is
(c + (1-pw).k)/pwD. This is clearly greater than W0 . 26 If the costs of
bringing forward information are borne disproportionately by
whistleblowers that received weak signals, the deterrent effect on fraud is

126. If 1-p,> 0, then S will also shift to the right as well. The shift, however, will be less than the
shift in W. Now, Sj will be (c + (1-p,).k)IpD. The change in S is S/k = (1-p)IpD, which is

unambiguously smaller than the change in W, SW 5k = (1-p,)/pD.
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stronger. In the next sub-section, we set out the argument that this is
exactly what the FCA qui tam mechanism provides.
FIGURE 2
Pooling
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No informnants

Separating
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Informants with
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come forward
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No deterrence
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awarded to
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If costs are contingent on bringing unsuccessful claims, the likelihood of a
separating equilibrium increases.

c. The Screening Benefits of Qui Tam Actions under the FCA
Qui tam actions under the FCA present three, additional screening
opportunities over blowing the whistle directly to the regulating agency.
First, there are costs of bringing suit in court. Second, these additional
costs of bringing a qui tam action are more likely to be borne by parties
who have weak information. Third, plaintiffs' lawyers who work on
contingency fees will act as an additional screen 127 on the quality of

127. Pamela Bucy has emphasized a related point. She argues that the complexity and cost of
prosecuting an FCA case will discourage inexperienced counsel from taking these cases. Bucy, supra
note 10, at 58. This is a different form of screening. It is not clear, however, why this would be true.
An inexperienced lawyer faced with a strong signal for an FCA case would stand to receive an
enormous return on her effort. While plaintiffs may tend to choose more experienced lawyers, that
result should be expected in most areas of litigation. David Freeman Engstrom's work suggests the
methods of selecting attorneys and the qualities of success are more complicated. Engstrom finds that
"certain repeat players-namely former DOJ prosecutors turned private sector relator counsel-are far
more likely to persuade the DOJ to exercise its powerful authority under the FCA to intervene in qui
tam cases and push them to resolution." Engstrom, supra note 19, at 1251. But he also finds that they
are involved in a small number of cases and achieve lower returns for the government than other
successful cases. Id. at 1251-52.
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information that is brought forward. 128 This third argument has been made
in the literature discussing the merits of contingency fees more
generally. 129 We will, therefore, restrict our analysis to the first two
arguments. 130
Qui tam actions are costly. Above, we argued that whistleblowers bear
a large private cost from truncated career opportunities. There are two,
additional types of cost that must be borne by plaintiffs under the FCA that
informants who report directly to the regulator do not have to pay. First,
there are upfront costs. There are significant costs of hiring attorneys,
filing costs, and substantiating claims. The plaintiff will expend a great
deal of time, effort, and energy. Under the FCA, the plaintiff must prove to
the judge that he has cleared a number of statutory hurdles. Additionally,
as with any lawsuit, the plaintiff must meet minimum pleading
requirements. 131 These will be greater than the requirements of providing a
tip to the SEC.1 32 The pleading requirement costs will likely deter potential

128. The plaintiff will need to expend resources to convince the lawyer that the signal is a good
one. This cost is not worth expending if the signal is weak, but it is if the signal is strong. As we see
below, qui tam litigation introduces several of these case development screening points: (1) the lawyer
screens; (2) the court screens on a motion to dismiss; and (3) the DOJ screens in making its decision to
proceed. At each point, the plaintiff is undertaking costs that are likely to be wasted if the signal is
weak.

129. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004) [hereinafter KRITZER, RISKS]; Herbert M. Kritzer,
Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997);

Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Susan Scotchmer, Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis, 24
RAND J. ECON. 343 (1993); William H. J. Hubbard, A Theory of Pleading,Litigation, and Settlement
30-31 (Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 446; Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law &
Economics Research Paper No. 663, Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2360723.
130. It is worth noting though that the role of contingency fee lawyers will not be nearly as
important in the DFA context. First, the need to retain counsel in making a tip under the DFA is much
lower. The primary benefit is that it ensures anonymity. But that role should be significantly smaller
than the role of the lawyer in the FCA context. Second, the cost to the lawyer of advising on a weak
anonymous tip under the DFA is negligible especially when compared to the costs of filing an FCA
suit. Lawyers should be expected to do less screening in the DFA context.
131. Generally, a plaintiff may be able to signal the strength of their case to the defendant at the
pleadings stage of proceedings in civil suits. William Hubbard notes: "through factually detailed
pleading.., a plaintiff communicates the strength of her case... " See Hubbard, supra note 129, at 5.
132. The SEC cannot realistically impose similar "pleading requirements" for tips. The SEC
would have an incentive to declare all tips insufficient and then investigate the case anyway, keeping
the recovery and not paying the tip. If, on the other hand, the SEC committed to pay whenever there is
a recovery, the pleading requirement would be meaningless. The qui tam mechanism makes it difficult
for a plaintiff's lawyer or the DOJ to reject a tip and continue with the case. And the court lacks the
internal incentive to dismiss the case to squeeze out the whistleblower because it receives none of the
recovery.
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plaintiffs from filing suit,133 but, as noted above, this increase can bolster
the screening effect. In Figure 13 41, these upfront costs shift both
thresholds-S and W-to the right.
Second, the costs incurred by whistleblowers under the FCA
mechanism are disproportionately borne by whistleblowers with weak
information. That is, some costs are only borne by parties who lose in
court. For example, under the FCA the court can award costs (such as
attorney's fees, etc.) to the successful side. 35 This acts like a fine on the
losing whistleblower. While fee-shifting arrangements are not unique to
FCA litigation, 1 6 as a practical matter fee shifting is almost unheard of in
out-of-court whistle-blowing schemes. In theory, the DFA would look
much more like the FCA if there was a fee (or fine) imposed on tipsters
who do not prevail. But it may be difficult to implement. Allowing the
SEC to fine the whistleblower for a failed investigation when the
whistleblower had no control over the investigation introduces complex
moral hazard problems. This determination would have to be adjudicated
by a third party-most likely a court. As a practical matter, we can expect
the court to defer almost entirely to the SEC in the decision to pursue an
investigation. And even if the court steps in, the whistleblower should only
prevail if it shows that the investigation should have been successful. That
litigation in turn will look a great deal like the litigation that the
whistleblowers undertake in the first place in the qui tam system. A world
where we have tips directly to an agency who investigates but then we
employ a court to determine the value of the reward, the quality of the tip,
the propriety of pursuing the tip, and the costs imposed on the losing

133.

Law and economics theory on the decision to file suit is summarized in RICHARD A. POSNER,

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 593-639 (7th ed. 2003); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND

ECONOMICS 388-444 (4th ed. 2004); and Shavell, supra note 99, at 389-418.
134. In the more general model, it can be easily shown that increasing c, the upfront, private cost
of blowing the whistle, will result in both S = c/pD and W = c/pD shifting to the right.
135. On the effects of "English fees" and "American fees," see generally MARY FRANCIS
DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES (1995), which describes,
generally, the use of fee shifting; see also Peter van Wijck & Ben van Velthoven, An Economic
Analysis of the American and the Continental Rule for Allocating Legal Costs, 9 EUR. J.L. & ECON.,
Mar. 2000, at 115; Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen, & John Panzar, An Economic Analysis of
Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 173 (1984); John C.
Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 157 (1989);
Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper? 3 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 143 (1987), and H.S.E. Gravelle, The Efficiency Implications of Cost-Shifting Rules, 13 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1993). See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law,
in 3 HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661, 1732-33 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds.,

2002) (providing a brief survey of the law and economics literature on fee shifting); see also Ferziger
& Currell, supra note 21.
136. Engstrom makes this important critique of our analysis. See Engstrom, supra note 52.
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tipster, begins to look like a Rube Goldberg version of a qui tam
mechanism.
More fundamentally, under the FCA, the Department of Justice
investigates claims made by the whistleblower that has brought suit and
elects whether or not to join the case as co-plaintiff. This imposes two
costs-one that is fixed and one that is contingent on the quality of the
information.
The fixed cost is the cost of convincing the DOJ that the case is strong.
The DOJ acts as a screen in this way. The DOJ will typically join a strong
case; they will not join a weak case. The plaintiff is incurring significant
costs to develop the case while the DOJ is considering whether to join.
The DOJ's "investigation" often entails simply reviewing the results of the
plaintiff's discovery. Thus, the plaintiff incurs the cost to demonstrate the
strength of its case. This cost is likely to be wasted if the plaintiff knows
that its signal is weak. This is analogous to the costs of convincing the
contingent-fee lawyer, and convincing the judge at the motion-to-dismiss
stage. The DOJ will, however, require a greater level of proof to join the
case than the judge. In practice, it appears that these costs are real and
function as a strong screen. The federal government has, historically, been
a very good judge of the strength of a case following a preliminary
investigation. 13 When the DOJ joins a whistleblower in suit, the plaintiff
wins in approximately ninety-five percent of cases; when the DOJ does
not, the plaintiff wins in just five percent of cases."'
As an additional cost that is contingent on the strength of the signal,
when the DOJ joins the suit the remaining costs of suit are borne by the
government. In cases where the DOJ does not join, the whistleblower
(presumably with a weak case) must bear the litigation costs. This has the
effect of further encouraging informants with strong information, while
further discouraging informants with weak information. Such contingent
costs13 9 have the effect of shifting W14further
to the right, increasing the
0
likelihood of a separating equilibrium.
Qui tam actions under the FCA, therefore, provide a key institutional
advantage over whistleblowers reporting directly to a regulator. Litigation

137. An alternative explanation for the difference in success rates is that the government is a good
litigator, and not necessarily a good judge of the merits of a case. Our model assumes away differences
in litigation quality, merely focusing on informational quality.
138. See Kwok, supra note 10, at 6.
139. This cost is not purely "loss-contingent" but rather contingent upon the weakness of the
signal after the case has been partially developed. This has the same beneficial effect.
140. As noted above, with loss-contingent costs, k, the threshold for weak informants is
W1 = (c + (1-pq).k)/pD.
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forces individuals who blow the whistle to bear an upfront cost. Further,
the costs of litigation are greater as the probability of winning falls. This
discourages whistleblowers that know that they have poor information
from coming forward, thereby discouraging overzealous or nonmeritorious claims.
With similar effect the SEC might require a bond for tips. This is the
same as the fee-shifting fine discussed above. In some cases, the bond
might achieve the same outcome. But in others it might create perverse
incentives for the SEC
in choosing between investigating good tips and
141
just keeping the bond.
There are, of course, some qualifications to this screening benefit. We
have made some assumptions that, if relaxed, will dampen our results.
First, we assumed that informants have perfect knowledge of the quality of
their claim. Any uncertainty in the knowledge, however, will likely
weaken the positive effects. While whistleblowers may have good
information about the nature of the fraud, they may not be able to
determine the likelihood of success in courts. Cases of fraud can be highly
complex and this may reduce the likelihood that individuals blow the
whistle even when the merits of the case are very strong. Second, we have
assumed that individuals here are risk neutral. If individuals are risk
averse, though, loss-contingent costs may over deter individuals from
bringing claims. Qui tam actions represent a significant risk;
whistleblowers gamble the cost of suit and future employment
opportunities against possible gains. 14 2 This would deter individuals with
strong information who are averse to risk. 143
The screening benefits of the FCA mechanism are not found in the new
whistle-blowing regime under the DFA. The DFA mechanism seeks to
encourage whistle-blowing by both increasing the rewards available to
whistleblowers and reducing the cost of blowing the whistle. The losscontingent costs associated with blowing the whistle by bringing suit are
missing from the DFA. Encouraging whistle-blowing by allowing
anonymous reporting to the SEC without substituting in other costs, will
encourage weaker information, resulting in information overload for the
regulator.

141. See supra note 132, for why it would be difficult for the SEC to impose a similar upfront cost
without involving a qui tam mechanism.
142. See Rapp, supra note 19, at 119.
143. On the concept of risk aversion in the context of litigation, see Shavell, supra note 99, at
406-7. On the concepts of risk neutrality and risk aversion more generally, see ROBERT S. PINDYCK &
DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 165-70 (7th ed. 2009).
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One might imagine that if anonymity were not provided, the cost would
increase to a level that made it unnecessary to impose other costs. On the
other hand, it might be possible to offer anonymity in the FCA context
without sacrificing screening because costs are imposed through litigation.
That may or may not be feasible. The key takeaway is that costs cannot be
set haphazardly. And the near zero costs that the DFA is designed to
provide will not provide any meaningful screening.
In the end, the optimal reward-cost structure will, of course, depend on
many features. We know, though, that the SEC was receiving a high
number of complaints prior to the DFA whistle-blowing regime. The
problem was not a low volume of available whistleblowers. 144 Rather, if
there was a problem, it was one of screening for quality. 145 Our theory
suggests the mechanism implemented under the DFA will therefore be
counter-productive in deterring fraud.
III.

BROADER APPLICATIONS AND LMITATIONS

The fact that the above analysis focuses on fraud on the government
(FCA) and violations of securities laws (DFA) is not an inherent limitation
on the screening value of qui tam mechanisms. It is a function of the
magnitude and recent high profile of these two whistleblower programs.
As we have noted, whistleblower mechanisms are also used by the IRS to
detect tax fraud. Private suits on behalf of the government and other
whistle-blowing measures were widely used in English criminal law
before public police forces. 14 6 Qui tam suits have been used in intellectual
property law 14 7 and elsewhere. 148 Previous literature has noted the

144. Denise Voigt Crawford, former head of the Texas Securities Commission, made this point in
testimony before the Committee on Financial Services of the United States House of Representatives.
Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Invest Protection, Enhancing Oversight of Private
Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 11 lth Cong. 84 (2009), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/i 1/
printed%20hearings/i i1-84.pdf ("Well, the problem isn't that people weren't complaining to the
Securities and Exchange Commission. They receive I think about 750,000 complaints a year. The
problem is that they were ignoring them or at least not making good determinations with regard to
those complaints that really needed to be followed up on.").
145. Cf Madoff discussion, supra Part ll.B.3.a.
146. See J. M. BEATTI, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800, at 50-55 (1986)
(discussing the use of rewards, sometimes ad hoc and sometimes by statute, to obtain information
leading to apprehension of criminals).
147. See, e.g., False Marking Act that allowed qui tam actions on behalf of the government. 35
U.S.C. § 292 (2012). These qui tam provisions were, however, recently struck down as
unconstitutional by a federal district court. Unique Prod. Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., 813
F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Ohio 2011).
148. For example, there are qui tam-like provisions allowing for private suits regarding violations
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importance of whistleblower mechanisms when there is hidden
information and the government wishes to extract this private information.
Our analysis suggests that when there are sticky asymmetric information
problems-which is, of course, the definition of hidden information-the
screening mechanism is important. We have illustrated the benefit of a qui
tam mechanism over other whistleblower schemes in screening lowquality information from high-quality information.
That is not to say, however, that the qui tam mechanism is always the
silver bullet for rooting out hidden information; there may be other ways
to impose costs on whistleblowers. There are several limitations that our
model suggests should restrict the expansion of whistleblower rewards
generally and qui tam mechanisms in particular. In this part, we discuss
these limitations as well as areas where expansion will be valuable.
A. Limitation One: UlteriorMotives

The screening properties of qui tam are important insofar as they deter
firms from engaging in fraudulent behavior. Excessive rewards and
promises of anonymity are blunt instruments for encouraging whistleblowing and deterring fraud. By themselves, the instruments are blunt
because they focus on the quantity of information rather than the quality.
The ability of the government regulator to parse out meritorious claims
from non-meritorious claims is tightly linked to the deterrent value of
whistle-blowing.
The question of which tools to use to optimally deter dishonest
behavior may turn on the type of fraudulent activity that the government is
seeking to deter. So far we have bracketed issues regarding claims about
the types of motivations that drive whistleblowers. A long literature has
149
explored the non-pecuniary interests that may drive whistle-blowing.
Our model focuses on financial incentives. Rewards must be high enough
(relative to costs) to attract high-quality tips but costs must also be high
enough (relative to rewards) to screen out low-quality tips. Further, if costs
are increasingly contingent on outcome, then higher costs will screen out
low-quality information without deterring high-quality tips.
In other areas of regulation, however, potential whistleblowers may not
be as incentivized as our rational-actor model suggests. The government
must still contend with the problem of hidden information and the quality

of Native American protection laws, see 25 U.S.C. § 201 (2006), and regarding arming vessels against
a "friendly nation." See 18 U.S.C. § 962 (2006).
149. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1844 (2010).
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of the information provided. In these cases where financial rewards are
unlikely to be a strong factor in the decision of the whistleblower, then
mechanisms that reduce the private cost of blowing the whistle will be of
greater salience (assuming there are wealth constraints even for the
morally motivated). Anonymity and other measures that reduce the cost of
informing will be more effective tools for increasing the quantity of
information here. On the flip side, lower monetary rewards-even zero
rewards-may actually be correlated with higher quality information than
large financial rewards. That is, if we assume the morally motivated are
likely to have stronger information in an area than the financially
motivated, we may not need to use rewards, but may simply seek to lower
those costs that may deter altruistic and wealth-constrained
whistleblowers. The moral payout substitutes for the monetary payout and
is potentially contingent itself on the quality of the information. This will
be the case if those who only come forward where their moral
150 sensitivities
have been breached do so with more credible information.
There are other non-pecuniary motives that may present problems.
Individuals may come forward because they are seeking revenge. Revenge
can be difficult. On the one hand, like morality, it may be a substitute for
monetary rewards. 1 51 On the other hand, the revenge payout may not be
correlated with the quality of information. A terminated employee may be
happy to see her employer punished regardless of whether the employer
committed any fraud. Thus, the information brought forward by

150. In reality, of course, individuals may blow the whistle for a variety of non-financial reasons.
Take, for example, the case of three Canadian scientists working for Health Canada, the Canadian
government agency with responsibilities similar to those of the Food and Drug Administration in the
United States. In 1998, Dr. Shiv Chopra, Dr. Margaret Hayden, and Dr. Gerard Lambert blew the
whistle on what they alleged to be dishonest, drug approval processes for bovine growth hormone.
They contended that the long-term effects on cows and the effects on humans were inadequately tested
and that they were being pressured to approve the drug. These whistleblowers did not come forward
because of financial incentives. Rather, they were concerned for the integrity of the drug approval
system. All three whistleblowers lost their job. See Whistleblowers: Moment of Truth (CBC television
broadcast Oct. 19, 2012), available at http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/episodes/2012-2013/whistleblowersmoment-of-truth.
151. In unemployment benefit fraud, for example, the Australian government authority
responsible for distributing unemployment benefits and social security benefits (CentreLink) received,
on average, 2,115 phone calls each week from informants providing tip-offs as to recipients receiving
more than their entitlement. The information was given anonymously; none of the informants was paid
any money at all. In 2010, this information led to over 43,000 cases being reviewed and 7,954
payments being reduced (a success rate of under 20% of investigations). The anonymous
whistleblower scheme saved the Australian government over $2.3 million. Renee Viellaris, Number of
Australians Dobbing in Welfare Cheats Reaches All-Time High, THE SUNDAY MAIL (May 22, 2011,
12:00 AM), http://www.news.com.au/national old/number-of-australians-dobbing-in-welfare-cheatsreaches-all-time-high/story-e6frfkvr- 1226060326917.
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informants merely to generate bad publicity for the regulated firm may be
of lower quality. In those contexts, mechanism design is more
complicated. The interplay between costs,
monetary rewards, and a
15 2

revenge motive is difficult to intuit or test.

While these considerations may be prevalent elsewhere, we suspect
they do not loom large in the DFA context. First, in the context of
financial regulation, potential whistleblowers who work in the finance
15
industry are likely to be highly motivated by financial incentives. 1
Second, the financially-motivated-rational-actor model has generally
proven to be a stronger indicator of behavior of whistleblowers than other
explanations in the context of fraudulent behavior in business. 154
B. Limitation Two: Asymmetry of Information
The results of our model rely on the assumption that the individual
whistleblower has superior information to the government. This idea of
asymmetric information underpins the legal elements in whistleblower
statutes requiring that the information not be publicly disclosed or that the
' 155 of independent knowledge. 15 6
whistleblower be an "original source ,
These requirements generally prevent people from coming forward to
collect on information that is already public and in the hands of those who
can use the information properly. This limits the effect of the statutes to
scenarios with asymmetric information.

152. Other motivators may exist. And it may be important to distinguish altruism, indignation,
anger, and revenge. These and many other nuanced behavioral motivations may have a wide range of
varying correlation with accuracy. The "how's my driving" anonymous tipster programs might be
prime examples of the usefulness and influence of non-monetary incentives in encouraging the
reporting of accurate asymmetric information. These are discussed both theoretically and empirically
in the work of Lior Strahilevitz. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving?" For Everyone (and
Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699 (2006); David S. Abrams and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Do More
Eyes on the Road Mean Better Driving? A Field Experiment (Univ. of Pa. & Univ. of Chi., Working

Paper, Jan. 21, 2013), available at https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db
name=ALEA2013&paper id=308. This area of study may provide fertile ground for testing the
dynamic interplay of various incentives in whistleblowing.
153. Engstrom reaches as similar conclusion but on different grounds: "Lower moral
disapprobation in [the areas of tax, securities and procurement fraud] means that regulators cannot rely
on an underlying moralistic proclivity to report wrongdoing. Nor is there a substantial risk of crowdout, as there is little moralistic motivation to report wrongdoing in the first place." Engstrom, supra
note 52 (footnote omitted).
154. For a more comprehensive discussion of the literature on financial rewards of
whistleblowers, see Dyck et al., supra note 18.
155. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012).
156. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(B)(2).
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We noted in Part I that justifications of the qui tam mechanism based
on regulatory capture of agencies ignored this distinction. Agency capture
and the need to solve it are not unique to whistleblower allegations. But
asymmetric information is. And that is why a central value of the qui tam
mechanism is its ability to screen information.
The upshot is that qui tam mechanisms-or mechanisms that resemble
or mimic qui tam mechanisms-may be less valuable or more problematic
if applied to scenarios without asymmetric private information but large
agency costs. Though not explicitly a qui tam mechanism, in the law of
corporations the shareholders' derivative suit may pose this type of
scenario. 157 The derivative lawsuit is a mechanism for a shareholder to
bring suit (at least in theory) on behalf of the corporation (usually, but not
necessarily, against the current or former directors or officers of the
corporation). 5 8 It is essentially a qui tam procedure where the derivative
plaintiffs attorney fills the role
of "whistleblower" and receives the
1 59
(sometimes quite hefty) reward.
But derivative suits are generally not ones where the plaintiff has
hidden information that needs to be coaxed out. 160 Indeed, Delaware courts
1 61
have, for decades, lamented that it is usually quite the opposite.
Justifications for derivative suits instead focus primarily on the agency
problem. Unlike FCA and DFA whistleblower cases, the source of the
plaintiffs knowledge is irrelevant. But the existence of a conflict of
interest is paramount. A derivative plaintiff with original hidden
information will nonetheless be precluded (by way of the demand
requirement) from bringing suit where the directors are deemed to have no

157. We view class actions as a different category altogether dealing with much broader problems
of coordination and collective action. We do not address those here.
158. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (a seminal case on derivative litigation
and the procedural demand requirements imposed on derivative plaintiffs).
159. The attorneys in Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012), received
fees of $304 million in a derivative suit. That is an outlier, but fees for successful cases are substantial.
160. For a more general discussion of the economics of derivative suits, see FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATh LAW 100-02

(1991).
161. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (lamenting the failure of derivative
plaintiffs in using statutory tools such as DGCL § 220 to request to inspect the books and records that
are in possession of the board directors-whose members are usually the defendants-to obtain
information to verify if they can meet the pleading requirements in a derivative suit); South v. Baker,
62 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. 2012) ("[O]ur Supreme Court has admonished stockholders repeatedly to use
Section 220 of the General Corporation Law to obtain books and records and investigate their claims
before filing suit.").
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conflict 162 and a derivative plaintiff suing on public information163will be
allowed to proceed if she can show the directors are not impartial.
Derivative suits certainly have not been praised as the gold standard for
rooting out corporate misbehavior. And our analysis above suggests that
the mechanism is ill designed. A qui tam like mechanism, in a world
without a central problem of asymmetric information,164 is raising costs
and rewards needlessly. The lure of hefty fees attracts more and more
claims. In response, the courts have continued to ratchet up the cost side of
the equation with strict demand requirements, special committees
empowered to dismiss suits, the imposition of pre-filing requirements, and
the like. As these costs increase, plaintiffs require higher rewards to bring
even the strongest cases. In turn, the fees awarded to attorneys for those
best cases have to go up.
This suggests the corporate governance setting may be precisely the
case (as opposed to true whistleblower situations) where a DFA
mechanism-where shareholders file grievances to an outside agency that
pursues violations of corporate governance-would be optimal.165 The
derivative procedure with its qui tam quality is poorly designed, given the
problem it addresses. It is not effective screening to artificially raise costs
for parties who have no private information. Most of these cases start with
public disclosures or news reports. Plaintiffs' lawyers then race to be the
first to overcome the court-imposed hurdles. This race provides no new
information to the corporation or its other shareholders. In a weak attempt
to make the process more effective, courts have insisted that plaintiffs
make a request to see the books and records of the corporation so they can
look for wrongdoing and conflict. This is a fairly pointless mechanism.

162. To put it simply, the derivative plaintiff must first make demand on the directors to cause the
corporation to bring the suit. The only way around this is for the plaintiff to show that demand was
futile because the directors are conflicted and not impartial in making the decision. See Grimes, 673
A.2d 1207. If the plaintiff makes demand, and it is refused, the plaintiff faces a very high burden of
showing that demand was wrongfully rejected.
163. See Aronson, 473 A.2d 805; Grimes, 673 A.2d 1207.
164. Of course, it might be different if these suits were being brought by inside employees rather
than outside shareholders. That would look much more like the cases that the DFA is directed at. But
only shareholders have standing to bring derivative suits. And the overwhelming bulk of cases are
brought by outside shareholders not employees who own shares.
165. Another option that has been explored elsewhere would be to have outside law firms bid for
the right to pursue the case. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintifsf' Attorney's
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,

58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1991) (proposing an auction system of choosing counsel); Randall S. Thomas &
Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 Nw. U.

L. REv. 423 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: A Rejoinder, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 458 (1993); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block:

Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 650 (2002).
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Plaintiffs' lawyers have no special talent for reviewing books and records
and the information in those books and records is controlled and filtered
by the very directors and officers who are alleged to have a conflict.
The whole process imposes a cost on the corporation and the plaintiffs
while providing no real screening or signaling. As costs increase, the
rewards (in fees) have to increase to keep the plaintiffs in the game. As a
result, fees are high but cases are extremely costly to bring. This is a waste
that is designed to deal with the wrong problem.
This cycle of raising costs and damages has little screening effect. In
some sense, all of the potential plaintiffs have the same signal based on
public reports. Some cases are good and some are bad, but the plaintiffs
have no way of knowing. As long as the odds are good, they bring a
portfolio of cases fishing for the big one. Because the signal remains
constant, moving the cost or benefit thresholds does nothing to alter the
quality of the pool. If anything, moving both thresholds up just favors risk
seeking firms, firms with larger portfolios of cases, or firms with liquidity
advantages that can invest more in overcoming the upfront hurdles.
Here, where the problem is real agency capture and not hidden
information, an independent agency that responds to information (public
reports and tips) and rewards tips with a small (perhaps even fixed) reward
should reduce costs significantly and address agency problems more
directly. 166
C. Limitation Three: Public vs. PrivateScreening

The corporate governance case just discussed might be viewed as a
pseudo-public mechanism. These are private entities, but the shares are
widely held and the benefits of any action are spread across millions of
shares. But what about true private settings? Surely, asymmetric
information is a problem that faces private firms in their dealings with
employees and counterparties.
If the screening value of qui tam is so strong, should we allow parties
to stand in the shoes and bring suits on behalf of other private parties? For
example, let's say that there are two employees of IBM and one employee
has strong private information that the other has committed fraud against
IBM: Does our model suggest that it would be beneficial for the whistle-

166. The history of Delaware derivative cases demonstrates that outside tips and information will
generally not have great value. Complaints are often filled with nothing but a recitation of public
information-or worse, an exact copy of a complaint in another proceeding. The purpose of tips would
just be to bring lower-profile public information to the agencies attention.
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blowing employee to take a private action on behalf of IBM against the
fraudulent employee? We should be careful to acknowledge the limits of
the theory.
Qui tam is a solution when the problem of information asymmetry is
great and is intractable; it should be used only when the information
asymmetry is difficult to resolve not when the information can be cheaply
verified. The cost of unpacking the truth about fraud against the
government can be great, given the scale and scope of government
operations. Similarly, the cost of the government detecting corporate
securities fraud is high. 167 It is not clear that informational problems
cannot be overcome in the private-party situation with lower cost by using
other mechanisms. To continue with our IBM example: IBM would have
its own internal structure for dealing with fraudulent behavior by an
employee against the company. Allowing qui tam type suits here may
undermine these internal mechanisms.
The same may not be true, however, if IBM is worried about its
contracts with outsiders. If a third-party supplier is defrauding IBM, it may
very much want to reward employees of that supplier for bringing suit on
its behalf. Presumably, such a system would allow firms to opt in or out of
any mechanism. For example, IBM might not care enough about small
fraud that was immaterial to its profit reporting at an unimportant vendor.
But the opposite might be true for its largest suppliers, distributors or
retailers. A system could be developed for a firm to opt into a public
system where certain claims against certain parties could be brought on its
behalf. We would expect to see this opt-in behavior where the
relationships are important and the asymmetry is both large and
intractable.
All of that said, such proposals start to run into other areas of
theoretical concern that we must reserve for another day. Chief among
those is the theoretical and empirical concerns about third-party financing

167.

See supra Part II.A.

2014]

NOISE REDUCTION: THE SCREENING VALUE OF QUI TAM

1215

of private
litigation. 168 There is much to be said on both sides of that
69
1

debate.

Finally, private settings that do not involve litigation or disputes might
also present asymmetric information problems where our analysis is
relevant. For example, companies often want to get information from
outsiders about the performance of their employees or other non-human
assets. 1 0 Facebook, for example, offers a minimum $500 reward to users
who report technical bugs in their program. 1 Our model predicts that
Facebook will get too many tips because they do not impose a cost on the
tipsters. Some of Facebook's comments regarding those tips suggest this is
true. One tipster found a bug that allowed him to post on private timelines
of people he is not connected to. His tip was ignored and Facebook noted
that it could not respond to tips when its technicians cannot reproduce the
bug. The tipster responded by posting his complaint on the private
timeline of Facebook's CEO Mark Zuckerberg. He did not receive the
1
reward. 72

Facebook's response appears to be of the same nature as the SEC's
response to tips about Bernie Madoff.1 71 In a world of too much
information, the recipients are forced to adopt high (perhaps arbitrary)
criteria for responding to tips. Our model suggests Facebook might be
wise to adopt a system that imposes costs on the tipsters to screen the
1
information. 74

168. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8
J.L. ECON. & POLICY 593 (2012); Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party
Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REv. 571, 574 (2010); Daniel C. Cox, Comment,
Lawsuit Syndication: An Investment Opportunity in Legal Grievances, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 153, 15459 (1990). The issue has been discussed in popular press: Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money
on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at Al; Lisa Rickard, Why Are Hedge Funds
Allowed to Invest in Litigation?, THE ATLANTIC (July 3, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.theatlantic.
com/national/archive/2012/07/why-are-hedge-funds-allowed-to-invest-in-litigation/259345/;
Vanessa
O'Connell, Funds Spring Up to Invest in High-Stakes Litigation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3,2011, at B1.
169. The financing of litigation also ties in with the role of lawyers on contingent fees. We
acknowledge that contingency fees for lawyers can operate as a screening mechanism. In some sense,
with contingency fees, the lawyer is "buying" a partial stake in a suit. They will only take on suits that
have a high likelihood of winning. While the precise mechanism is different, the screening effect is
similar to that of qui tam. For more on contingency fees, see Kritzer, supra note 129 and references
within.
170. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 152; Strahilevitz & Abrams, supra note 152.
171. Bug Bounty Info, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/whitehat (last visited Feb. 11,
2014) (login required).
172. Steven Musil, Researcher Posts Facebook Bug Report to Mark Zuckerberg's Wall, CNET
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2013, 11:36 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023 3-57599043-93/researcher-postsfacebook-bug-report-to-mark-zuckerbergs-wall/.
173. See supra note 144.
174. They might also adopt a mechanism that commits them to a formula for determining the
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CONCLUSIONS

Efficient detection of fraud is important. Detection by an ill-informed,
resource-constrained regulator can be improved by tapping into private
information held by individuals. By using this private information, the
regulator can focus its resources on investigating those firms who are more
likely to have committed fraud. In doing so, the regulator can deter fraud
at lower cost. Whistleblowers, therefore, serve an important regulatory and
social function. Providing financial rewards to whistleblowers who
successfully uncover fraud encourages this outcome. Financial rewards
alone, however, are not perfect. The increase in the quantity of information
should not come at the expense of the quality of information. Diluting the
quality of the information reduces the deterrent value and can defeat the
ultimate purpose of the scheme.
We suggest that the mechanism through which whistleblowers are
channeled to seek reward affects the incentives of the whistleblower in
dynamic ways. By making rewards to whistleblowers contingent upon
success and making the losses suffered by whistleblowers contingent upon
failure, the quality of the information will increase. The mechanism needs
to balance both the rewards and the costs to maximize the likelihood of
detecting fraud and generating optimal deterrence.
The rewards under the DFA scheme are success-contingent, but the
private costs that must be borne by whistleblowers are low and not losscontingent. This reduction in cost reduces the height of the screen and
serves to encourage whistleblowers with low-quality information. Under
the DFA scheme, we predict that the SEC will be inundated with, on
average, lower quality tips. We further predict that this information
overload will dilute the deterrence effect.
It is too early to determine whether our predictions about the DFA's
whistle-blowing scheme are being borne out, although the SEC has
already reported a large number of tips.1 7 5 Since the adoption of the new
whistle-blowing scheme, the SEC has considered but rejected changing

reward rather than the current scheme: "There is no maximum reward: each bug is awarded a bounty
based on its severity and creativity." Bug Bounty Ifo, supra note 171; see Ferziger & Currell, supra
note 21 (noting the value of a nondiscretionary reward).
175. In the first seven weeks of the program in 2011 there were 334 tips. There were 3001 official
tips in fiscal year 2012 and 3238 in fiscal year 2013. In 2013 the attorneys in the office returned 2018
phone calls-all within 24 hours. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 49 at 8. Pre-DFA systems
for collecting and reporting tips makes it difficult to make a direct comparison, and as we noted above,
the problem has never appeared to one of quantity. See supra notes 118-19 & 144-45.
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the mechanism to one that requires qui tam actions. 17 6 The Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) decided against recommending qui tam on the
grounds that such actions "could attract unscrupulous bounty hunters" and
"may result in undesirable outcomes such as frivolous litigation., 1 77 Our
model suggests the exact opposite. Unscrupulous whistle-blowing and
frivolous lawsuits are more likely to be a concern under the current DFA
scheme that has no imposed costs to screen them out.
The qui tam mechanism works well in the FCA context precisely
because a court-centric system disproportionately places the burden for
losses on plaintiffs with poor information. Our model predicts that courts
under the FCA are not likely inundated with poor tips and non-meritorious
1 78
claims. This is precisely what the empirical literature bears out.
These screening benefits of qui tam under the FCA have been curiously
overlooked in the literature. Prior work comparing the court-centric
mechanism of the FCA to the regulator-centric mechanism of the DFA
focuses on other aspects of the mechanism, such as agency capture. Of
greater concern is the quality of information that can be generated using
the court as a screen. Erecting this screen better achieves the primary
purpose of the whistle-blowing regimes: deterring fraud.

176.

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF AUDITS, EVALUATION

OF THE SEC WHISTLEBLOWER'S PROGRAM, REPORT No. 511 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/

about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2013/511 .pdf.
177. Id. at 28.

178. See Kwok, supra note 10, Kwok, supra note 29, and Engstrom, supra note 19.

